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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CERCLA CLEANUP
PROCEDURES: STRIKING A BALANCE TO PREVENT
IRREPARABLE HARM
Lucia Ann Silecchia*

0 if we but knew what we do
When we delve or hewHack and rack the growing green! ....
Where we, even where we mean
To mend her we end her,
When we hew or delve:
After-comers cannot guess the beauty been.'

I. INTRODUCTION
When Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") 2 in 1980 in
response to the problems of toxic waste and hazardous substances,
the central goals of the Act were clear. CERCLA was intended to
provide an effective mechanism for cleaning up such dangers as
quickly as possible, 3 with as little expense as feasible, and with as
* Assistant Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, The Columbus
School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Queens College of the City University of
New York. I am grateful to my research assistants, Sergio Borgiotti, Teresa Boyle, and
Michael D. Simons, for their contributions to this Article and to Professor Alice Kaswan
for her suggestions. This Article is dedicated to my family.
1. GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS, Binsey Poplars, in THE POEMS OF GERARD MANLEY
HOPKINS 78, 78-79 (W.H. Gardner & N.H. MacKenzie eds., 4th ed. 1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
3. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3038 ("CERCLA has two goals: (1) to provide for clean-up if a
hazardous substance is released into the environment or if such release is threatened, and
(2) to hold responsible parties liable for the costs of these clean-ups:'); 132 CONG. REc.
H9599 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Sen. Scheuer) ("[The people] want the
overriding purpose of this bill which is to protect the lives, the health, and the safety and
the well-being of the American public from these nauseating toxic wastes that litter our
country by the thousands.").
Cases decided since the passage of CERCLA-both before and after the 1986
amendments-have echoed these goals. See, e.g., Price v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d
1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 1994) ("CERCLA was enacted to facilitate the cleanup of environmental contamination caused by hazardous waste releases."); United States v. Colorado,
990 F.2d 1565, 1570 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 'to initiate
and establish a comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control the
vast problems associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites."')
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 1016(I), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994); Boarhead Corp. v.
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much of that expense as possible borne by the responsible parties,
rather than by the taxpayers. 4 Accordingly, CERCLA included provisions for establishing liability for the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste sites. Congress also created the Superfund to pay for
those cleanups for which no solvent responsible parties could be
5
found.
In order to further CERCLA's goals, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA") 6 in 1986.
Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1019 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Congress enacted CERCLA so that the
EPA would have the authority and the funds necessary to respond expeditiously to serious
hazards without being stopped in its tracks by legal entanglements before or during the
hazard clean-up."); Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. United States EPA, 812 F.2d 383, 387 (8th
Cir. 1987) ("Recognizing the grave consequences arising from delays in cleaning up
hazardous waste sites, Congress gave the EPA authority to direct clean-up operations prior
to a final judicial determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties affected:'); Lone
Pine Steering Comm. v. United States EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1985) ("CERCLA
was enacted in response to concerns about the danger to public health presented by
hazardous waste sites and the slow reaction by the EPA to solve the problem"), cert
denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986); United States v. M. Genzale Plating, Inc., 723 F. Supp.
877, 883 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("The purpose of CERCLA is to enable the President to target
and clean up hazardous waste sites in an efficient manner."); United States v. Rohm &
Haas Co., 669 F. Supp. 672, 674 (D.N.J. 1987) ("In CERCLA, Congress established a
statutory scheme to ensure prompt and efficient clean-up of hazardous waste disposal
sites"); Pacific Resins & Chems., Inc. v. United States, 654 F. Supp. 249, 253 (W.D. Wash.
1986) ("The purpose of Congress in passing CERCLA was to establish the authority and
funding for the prompt, unhindered clean-up of dangerous hazardous waste sites without
the need to await a final judicial determination of liability or even before any final agency
determination of liability."); B.R. MacKay & Sons v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1290,
1293 (D. Utah 1986) ("Congress enacted [CERCLA] in response to increasing concern
over the severe environmental and public health effects from improper disposal of
hazardous waste ....While the EPA had authority under other statutes to bring suit and
compel cleanup, it lacked the authority and the funding to respond immediately... before
legal determinations of liability were made.").
4. For a general discussion of recovery actions against responsible private parties
and CERCLA's general "polluter pays" liability schemes, see James B. Brown & Michael
V. Sucaet, Environmental Cleanup Efficiency: Private Recovery Actions for Environmental
Response Costs, 7 COOLEY L. REv. 363, 363-71 (1990); Alfred R. Light, SARA's
Consequences: The Emerging Legal Debate Over Liability, Contribution, & Administrative
Law, in HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION AFTER THE RCRA AND CERCLA AMENDMENTS
1987, at 57 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 326, 1987).
5. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1994) (regulating use of Superfund money). The
Superfund itself is "a trust fund fueled by taxes on the oil and petrochemical industries,
corporations, and general revenues, to be used to clean up releases of hazardous substances
into the environment." Alfred R. Light, The Importance of "Being Taken": To Clarify and
Confirm the Litigative Reconstruction of CERCLA's Text, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1,
1 n.1 (1990) [hereinafter Light, The Importance of "Being Taken"].
6. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). This section became effective on
October 17, 1986. For an analysis of the ways in which the SARA amendments changed
each individual portion of CERCLA, see Timothy B. Atkeson, Seth Goldberg, Frederick
E. Ellrod III & Sandra L. Connors, An Annotated Legislative History of the Superfund
Amendments and ReauthorizationAct of 1986 (SARA), 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,363 (Dec. 1986). For a general discussion of SARA's structure and goals, see David J.
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Through SARA, Congress intended to address some of CERCLA's
initial limitations, 7 fine-tune some of its major components, 8 focus
greater attention on human health issues, 9 and provide ways of
Hayes & Conrad B. MacKerron, Superfund II: A New Mandate: A BNA Special Report,
17 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 42 part H (Feb. 13, 1987).
7. For discussions of the weaknesses of CERCLA as originally written, examine
132 CONG. Rc. H9586 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Fields) ("When
Congress first enacted the Superfund Program 6 years ago, little was known about the
extent of our Nation's hazardous waste problem. Now, we know a great deal more. We
know the problem is bigger than anyone initially anticipated .

. .

. We know that the

Superfund Program which is now is [sic] place has not worked as well its [sic] authors
had hoped."); 132 CONG. REC. S14,898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Stafford) ("A major goal of [SARA] is to establish specific, uniform national health
standards that will apply to cleanup decisions at Superfund sites ....

The Congress has

been compelled to develop such specific standards because the executive branch failed to
do so during the first 4 years of the program . . . "'). It has been theorized that the
relatively hasty passage of CERCLA led to its inadequacies:
The bill which became law was hurriedly put together by a bipartisan
leadership group of senators (with some assistance from their House counterparts), introduced, and passed by the Senate in lieu of all other pending
measures on the subject ....

It was considered on December 3, 1980, in the

closing days of the lame duck session of an outgoing Congress. It was
considered and passed, after very limited debate, under a suspension of the
rules, in a situation which allowed for no amendments. Faced with a complicated bill on a take it-or-leave it basis, the House took it, groaning all the
way.

Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1
(1982).
The murky legislative history of CERCLA is also discussed by Jeffrey H. Howard
& Linda B. Benfield, CERCLA Liabilityfor Hazardous Waste Generators:How FarDoes
Liability Extend?, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 1193, 1195-97 (Oct. 14, 1988).
8. See Patricia L. Quentel, Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutions for
HazardousWaste Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 139, 142 n.12 (1988)
("[SARA] toughened hazardous waste cleanup standards, accelerated Superfund activity,
broadened the EPA's power to reach settlements with responsible parties, and gave new
and more compelling incentives for private parties to become involved in cleanup activities
as soon as possible."); William A. Shirley, Note, When EPA Cleans a CERCLA Site:
Preclusion of Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review with Respect to Generators and Transporters, 36 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 187, 189 (1989) (identifying "contribution,
intervention, public participation, settlements, citizens suits, and judicial review" as
primary targets of 1986 amendments (citations omitted)). However, praise for SARA's
accomplishments is far from unqualified. See, e.g., James R. Deason, Note, Clear as Mud:
The Function of the National Contingency Plan Consistency Requirement in a CERCLA
Private Cost-Recovery Action, 28 GA. L. REv. 555, 559 (1994) ("The substantial revision
to CERCLA during its 1986 reauthorization did little to clarify matters. In fact, criticism
of CERCLA remains rampant." (citations omitted)); see also infra note 197 (discussing
current dissatisfaction with CERCLA scheme).
9. See Martin R. Siegel, Integrating PublicHealth Into Superfund: What Has Been
the Impact of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry?, 20 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,013, 10,013(Jan. 1990) ("With the passage of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) in 1986, Congress showed increased interest in
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budget allocation and taxation necessary to fund the Superfund as
its staggering true cost began to become apparent. 10
One of the most important ways in which Congress attempted
to refine CERCLA was through the inclusion of a provision in
SARA which placed strict limitations on the timing of pre-enforcement judicial review of ordered cleanups.11 Congress recognized
that the ambitious goals of CERCLA and SARA, especially the
goal of providing rapid cleanups, could be seriously hampered by
dilatory litigation. 12 Thus, Congress added provisions to CERCLA
the relationship between hazardous waste sites and human health effects" (footnote
omitted)).
10. See Earl K. Madsen, Dennis L. Arfmann, & John Galbavy, Superfund Reauthorization: An Opportunity to Rectify Major Problems, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 1020,
1024 (Oct. 1, 1993) ("During the 1980s, cost effectiveness was, at best, a secondary
concern. Since the average cleanup cost at NPL sites is estimated at $21 million to
$30 million and total estimates range up to $750 billion, cost effectiveness should be a
primary goal of Superfund.' (footnotes omitted)).
The exact cost of CERCLA cleanup efforts is still a matter of uncertainty and
ever-increasing estimates:
[O]ver the past decade, the estimated number of sites potentially contaminated
with hazardous wastes has escalated from a few thousand to between 300,000
and 400,000. In turn, more recent government estimates of the eventual cost
for the privately and publicly financed cleanup of such sites over the next few
decades exceeds $500 billion.
Michael J. Gergen, The Failed Promise of the "PolluterPays" Principle:An Economic
Analysis of LandoivnerLiability for Hazardous Waste, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 624, 624 (1994).
Yet, "[a] 1989 Standard & Poor's study predicted that the cost of cleaning up
existing hazardous waste sites could be as high as $700 billion" Id. at 624 n.2 (citing
Bruce F. Freed, The Politics of Pollution Liability, 89 Best's Review, Property/Casualty/
Insurance Edition, at 38, 40 (Mar. 1989); see also Michael Oxley, Making it Work, WASH.
TneFs, Dec. 17, 1995, at B4 (Superfund's "abysmal record comes at the cost of more than
$60 billion in public and private monies.").
11. Of course, the judicial bar was not the only significant subject of the amendments; other issues also faced Congress as part of this review process. Specifically, it has
been observed that the amendment process was geared "generally to three areas: judicial
review, contribution, and citizen suits.' Light, The Importance of "Being Taken", supra
note 5, at 11.
12. Even without the obstacles to remediation posed by litigation, CERCLA cleanups are lengthy procedures under the best of circumstances. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliot,
Superfund: EPA Success, National Debacle?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1992, at
11, 12 ("[I]t takes, on average, ten years to clean up each site, but only about three years
is actual on-site construction work!"); id. at 13 ("[I]t takes seven years and at least
$4 million in transaction costs at each site to conduct the necessary studies and design
remedies before the final cleanup can begin.'), quoted in Michael P. Healy, Judicial Review
& CERCLA Response Actions: Interpretive Strategies in the Face of Plain Meaning, 17
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 n.27 (1993); see also 132 CONG. REc. S14,928 (daily ed. Oct.
3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) ("[T]he timing of review section ensures that
Government and private cleanup resources will be directed toward mitigation, not litigation. The section is designed to preclude piecemeal review and excessive delay of
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which severely limit the jurisdiction of the federal district courts
to review removal or remedial actions before those actions are
completed.13 These limitations reflect the "clean up first,14litigate
later" philosophy behind this hazardous waste legislation.
Courts to date have applied this philosophy fairly consistently, 5
declining jurisdiction on the theory that hearing the litigation would
likely hamper CERCLA's legitimate focus on speedy resolution of

environmental disputes and provideresponsible parties with the means
for ducking or delaying responsibility. Ironically, however, there
may be instances in which avoiding judicial intervention could
actually undermine CERCLA's goal of environmental protection.
This possibility exists in those cases where the cleanup procedures
ordered may themselves cause irreparable harm to health or to the
environment.' 6 For example, "[t]he problem may be illustrated by
an extreme scenario that has the EPA deciding to take leaking
cleanup:'); Jennifer Silverman, Bliley to Offer Amendments on Liability, Brownfields to
GOP Reform Bill at Markup, 1996 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 17 (Jan. 26, 1996)
[hereinafter Silverman, Bliley to Offer] (quoting Rep. Thomas Bliley (R-Va.), commenting
that "[o]f the $15 billion spent on superfund in the last 16 years, 'over $7 billion has gone
to litigation-wasted on a silly, complex liability scheme"'); Oxley, supra note 10, at B4
("Nearly half of Superfund money is frittered away on litigation, bureaucracy and studies.
Only 53 percent of funds are spent actually cleaning up sites'").
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1994); see discussion of "completion" infra note 30.
14. See132 CONG. REc. 28,409 (1986) (statement of Sen. Stafford), cited in United
States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc., 31 F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 1994); see also B.R.
MacKay & Sons v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1290, 1294 (D. Utah 1986):
It appears that with the dangers or potential dangers caused by hazardous
substances, shooting first and asking questions later was the intent of Congress, making it clear that under CERCLA the EPA should have and has full
reign to conduct or mandate uninterrupted cleanups for the benefit of the
environment and the populous [sic].
Id., quoted in Michael T. Rosenberg, Note, SARA's Effect on EPA Cleanup Discretion
Under Superfund: Have the Courts Gone Too Far?, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 559, 561 n.10 (1991).
15. For a comprehensive listing of cases that have addressed this issue, see Elizabeth
Williams, Annotation, What Claims Fall Within Limitation Imposed by § 113(h) of
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42
USCS § 9613(h)) on Judicial Review of Cases Arising Under CERCLA, 116 A.L.R. FED.
69 (1993). For a compilation of cases addressing the recovery of response costs generally,
see Annotation, Governmental Recovery of Cost of Hazardous Waste Removal Under
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (42 USCS
§§ 9601 et seq.), 70 A.L.R. FED. 329 (1984).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc., 31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir.
1994). The factual basis for the Gamma-Tech case, described in detail infra part IV,
provides one specific example of a circumstance in which this may happen. Throughout
this Article however, when "irreparable harm" is mentioned, it refers to all those circumstances in which the execution of a cleanup may pose a health or environmental risk.
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drums containing a highly toxic substance from a dump site and
to empty them into a nearby lake, thus causing permanent damage
to public health and the environment." 1 7 Despite the danger that
this may happen, the CERCLA/SARA scheme currently provides
no statutory authorization for courts to review or enjoin proposed
cleanup procedures before the actions are completed.
However, Congress is now considering substantial revisions to
the CERCLA/Superfund scheme. 8 The issues to be considered include a wide range of initiatives that respond to many complex
issues. 19 One significant, albeit less "high profile," question that
Congress has an excellent opportunity to address is whether the
strict jurisdictional bar created in SARA should be left intact or
whether it should be changed to permit any judicial review. If
Congress elects to keep the bar as it currently stands, the danger
remains that some cleanups that may ultimately harm the environment or pose a health threat will be implemented with no meaningful judicial inquiry into their potential hazards. Yet, dropping
the jurisdictional bar completely overcompensates and may lead to
the protracted, dilatory litigation that Congress feared a decade
ago.
This Article suggests that, rather than pursue either of these
unwise extremes, Congress should strike a balance. Such a compromise should retain the general jurisdictional bar and those features that make the bar an effective curb on dilatory litigation.
However, the Article proposes that Congress create a specific exception to the bar which would allow a plaintiff20 to allege that a
cleanup must be reviewed if itposes a threat of irreparable harm to
humanhealth or the environment.
Fortunately, the proposal this Article advocates that Congress
adopt need not be made in a vacuum. Instead, in considering this
new approach Congress may find guidance in United States v.
Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc. ,21 a 1994 decision of the Third Circuit
17. Gamma-Tech, 31 E3d at 146.

18. As this Article went to press in mid-April, Congress had yet to pass legislation
reforming CERCLA. See discussion infra part V.B., regarding the current state of the
CERCLA amendment process. This Article was unable to account for any developments
in the legislative proposals that occurred after that date.
19. These issues are discussed more comprehensively in part V.B. of this Article.
20. As will be addressed later, this class of "plaintiffs" may include responsible
parties themselves and/or third parties bringing citizens suits.
21. 31 E3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994). A rehearing was denied in this case, en banc, in
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Court of Appeals that offers a framework for such a compromise.
In Gamma-Tech, the court deviated from the existing, strict, preenforcement litigation ban. The Gamma-Tech court created an exception for cases in which (1) a cost recovery action is brought by
the Environmental Protection Agency prior to the completion of
the allegedly harmful cleanup, 22 and (2) a responsible party recause "irsponds by alleging that the ordered cleanup may itself
23
reparable harm" to human health or the environment.
Finding such circumstances present in Gamma-Tech, the Third
Circuit decided that it had jurisdiction to review the case. This
decision represents a wise compromise in that it balanced the harms
of dilatory litigation against the danger of turning a blind eye and
a deaf ear to a potential hazard until it was too late to provide a
meaningful remedy.24 Unfortunately, while the exception crafted by
the Third Circuit was a sound and practical one from a policy
standpoint, it has little direct support in the existing language of
CERCLA that guarantees-or even allows-it to be applied to
cases other than Gamma-Tech itself. However, when Congress reexamines the jurisdictional bar in its current review of CERCLA,
it should draft a rule adopting those parts of the Gamma-Tech
decision which have particular merit, thereby allowing them to be
broadly applied. This Article explains how Congress might draft
such an amendment to CERCLA and why such a rule is desirable.
The Article examines the timing of judicial review of CERCLA cleanup programs and the delicate balance needed to create
an equitable rule. It begins with an overview of the legislation as
it is currently written: the general ban on judicial review, its limited
United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc., No. 93-5252, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 30566,
at *1 (3d Cir. 1994).
22. See Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 142-44. As discussed later, this procedural "twist"

made the court's decision much easier to justify.
23. See id. at 138; see also infra discussion of Gamma-Tech in part IV. Part of this

decision was grounded, of course, in the view that the remedial intent of these statutes
would be violated by the use of the jurisdictional bar to allow harmful action to continue.
24. Interestingly, this is not the first time a court has been concerned with the reality
that delay of review may, at times, lead directly to a denial of meaningful remedy. In North
Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1991), the court complained that "the

breadth of section 113(h) is troublesome" since there will be circumstances in which
"section 113(h) would be doing a good deal more than affecting the 'timing' of judicial
review; it would be extinguishing judicial review." Id. at 1245. After posing hypotheticals

in which this might be the practical outcome, the North Shore Gas court determined that
"[w]e can leave for another day the exploration of the outer bounds of this unusual

provision." Id. It may well be that the Gamma-Tech litigation is that "other day."
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exceptions, and the legislative history justifying it.25 The Article
then explores the ways in which courts prior to Gamma-Tech-both
before and after SARA-have addressed this issue and worked
within the parameters of the legislation. 26 Next, the Article discusses the Gamma-Tech decision, the logic behind the court's creation of an exception not found on the face of the Acts, 27 and the
effect of the court's ruling on subsequent cases. The Article posits
that the rule of Gamma-Tech provides an effective way to foster
the remedial goals of CERCLA. Thus, the Article presents a model
for a legislative solution to the problem based on the reasoning of
the Gamma-Tech case. 28 The Article concludes by critiqueing some
of the relevant proposals before Congress that address the jurisdictional bar and explains how the Gamma-Tech approach is supe29
rior.

This is the ideal time for the problem illustrated in GammaTech to be resolved in a complete and thoughtful way. In adopting
a new rule, Congress must find a solution that is consistent with
the scheme underlying CERCLA and which advances CERCLA's
goals rather than undermines them.
I. CERCLA & SARA: ADOPTING A "CLEAN Up FIRST,
LITIGATE LATER" PHILOSOPHY

CERCLA and the SARA provisions that refined it express a
clear disfavor for legal challenges to uncompleted environmental
cleanups,30 particularly when the challenges are brought by the
25. See discussion infra part II.
26. See discussion infra part III.
27. See discussion infra part IV.
28. See discussion infra part V.A.
29. See discussion infra part V.B.
30. The appropriate definition of "completed" is a matter of debate. The legislative
history of SARA suggests that, "the phrase 'removal or remedial action taken' is not
intended to preclude judicial review until the total response action is finished if the
response action proceeds in distinct and separate stages. Rather, an action under section
310 would lie following completion of each distinct and separable phase of the cleanup."
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3276, 3317. However, over-reliance on this piecemeal review process is criticized by the
court in In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 780 F. Supp. 1551 (E.D. Wash. 1991),
rev'd sub nom., Durfey v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours Co., 59 F.3d 121 (9th Cir. 1995). In
evaluating a plaintiff's argument that the court should have jurisdiction to review com-
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31
responsible or potentially responsible parties ("PRPs") themselves.
The statute itself contains a comprehensive jurisdictional bar on
the review of removal or remedial actions. 32 The statute provides:

No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law other
than under section 1332 of Title 28 (relating to diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction) or under State law which is applicable
or relevant and appropriate under section 9621 of this title
(relating to cleanup standards) to review any challenges to
removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this
title, or to review any order issued under section 9606(a) of this
title, in any action .... 33
Only five exceptions to this bar currently exist. They allow for
review of the removal or remedial measures in the following narrowly defined circumstances:
to recover re(1) An action under section 9607 of this title
34
sponse costs or damages or for contribution;
(2) An action to enforce an order issued under section 9606(a)
35
of this title or to recover a penalty for violation of such order;
(3) An action
for reimbursement under section 9606(b)(2) of
this title; 36
pleted segments of a larger project, the court reflected, "[D]espite whatever practical
appeal [this reading of § 9613(h) may] possess, [it] is unsupported by the statute itself
and appears clearly contrary to those several portions of the legislative record . . . which
seemingly say exactly the opposite." Id. at 1560. A full discussion of the meaning of
"completion" is beyond the scope of this Article. However, the practical issue of defining
"completion" is a significant one in evaluating when to invoke § 9613(h). See Light, The
Importance of "Being Taken", supra note 4, at 44-45 (discussing legislative debate
concerning meaning of term "completed").
31. For general background on the jurisdictional restrictions prior to Gamma-Tech,
see Healy, supra note 12; David Montgomery Moore, Comment, Pre-EnforcementReview
of Administrative Orders to Abate Environmental Hazards, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 675
(1992); Rosenberg, supra note 14; Light, The Importance of "Being Taken", supra note
5; Jeffrey M. Gaba & Mary E. Kelly, The Citizen Suit Provision of CERCLA: A Sheep in
Wolf's Clothing?, 43 Sw. L.J. 929 (1990); and Shirley, supra note 8.
32. Although beyond the scope of this Article, a fundamental threshold question is
the necessity of labeling an EPA action as a "removal" or a "remedy." Until this is done,
it is arguable that the strictures of § 9613 may not apply. Thus, as a practical matter,
defining the cleanup as something other than a removal or a remedy is no mere semantic
issue. For a full discussion of this definitional question and its far-reaching ramifications,
see Jerry L. Anderson, Removal or Remedial? The Myth of CERCLA's Two-Response
System, 18 CoLum. J. ENVTL. L. 103 (1993).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1994).
34. Id. at § 9613(h)(1).
35. Id. at § 9613(h)(2).
36. Id. at § 9613(h)(3).
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(4) An action under section 9659 of this title (relating to
citizens suits) alleging that the removal or remedial action
taken under section 9604 of this title or secured under section
9606 of this title was in violation of any requirement of this
chapter. Such an action may not be brought with regard to a
removal
where a remedial action is to be undertaken at the
37
site;

(5) An action under section 9606 of this title in which
the
38
United States has moved to compel a remedial action.

Several features of the restriction and its exceptions are readily
apparent. First, other than the citizens suit provisions, none of the
exceptions explicitly provides a means for challenging a removal
or remedial plan between the time the plan is ordered and the time
it is completed. 39 Second, the government has the authority to bring
an action against PRPs at any point to recover response costs, to
enforce orders against them, or seek penalties against them for
violating those orders. 40 However, these rights to bring proactive
litigation rest solely with the government-there is no corresponding right for the PRPs. Finally, and most relevant to this Article,
there is absolutely nothing on the face of any of these exceptions
that allows for emergency review of plans that pose a potential
threat to human health or the environment.

Undoubtedly, a fair amount of cynicism as to the motives
for challenges by PRPs contributed to the stringency of the
rule. 41 The legislative history of these provisions indicates that
Congress implemented the jurisdictional bar to prevent PRPs
37. Id. at § 9613(h)(4).
38. Id. at § 9613(h)(5).
39. The harsh impact of this is, perhaps, offset in part by the fact that CERCLA
does provide for extensive participation by citizens and potentially responsible parties in
the initial creation of the remedy. See discussion infra note 202 (outlining CERCLA
provisions allowing public participation). Thus, ideally, potential health and environmental
risks will be considered at that early stage. However, there are circumstances where those
harms are either undiscovered, unremedied, or underestimated in the development stage
and must be addressed later on. See also 132 CON. REC. H9583 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986)
(statement of Rep. Glickman) ("To balance this restriction on judicial review of the remedy
selected by the EPA, the conferees included provisions that require EPA to develop
extensive procedures for public participation in the selection of the cleanup plan and the
compilation of an administrative record.").
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1)-(2) (1994).
41. See Gaba & Kelly, supra note 31, at 946. In what is perhaps an understatement,
the authors comment, "In virtually all cases, PRP's are concerned not with the environmental
adequacy of a clean-up, but with the cost of cleanup that they will be required to bear" Id.
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from using dilatory litigation to delay42 or prevent cleanup actions. 43 Furthermore, Congress sought to avoid the increased trans42. The legislative history seems to indicate, however, that such unwanted delay
may continue to be ichieved if accomplished via state suits. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3317 ("New
section 113(h) is not intended to affect in any way the rights of persons to bring nuisance
actions under State law with respect to releases or threatened releases of hazardous
substances, pollutants, or contaminants?').
43. See, e.g., 132 CONG. Rc. H9583 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Glickman) ("[Nobody] want[s] to see an inadequate or inappropriate remedy built. If the
remedy is not adequate the neighbors may be injured .

. .

. If the remedy has to be rebuilt,

the potentially responsible parties may have to pay twice for the cleanup of one site.
Notwithstanding these arguments, the conferees decided to ensure expeditious cleanups by
restricting such preimplementation review?') (emphasis added); id. ("Clearly the conferees did
not intend to allow any plaintiff, whether the neighbor who is unhappy about the construction
of a toxic waste incinerator in the neighborhood, or the potentially responsible party who
will have to pay for its construction, to stop a cleanup by what would undoubtedly be a
prolonged legal battle. It was for this very reason that the conferees included section
113(h)."); 132 CONG. Rc. H9586 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Fields) ("I
discovered that as much as 50 percent of Superfund money was being spent on litigation,
not cleanup of waste sites?'); 132 CONG. REc. S14,928 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement
of Sen. Thurmond) ("[T]he timing of review section ensures that Government and private
cleanup resources will be directed toward mitigation, not litigation. The section is designed
to preclude piecemeal review and excessive delay of cleanup.').
This legislative history is often incorporated by reference in court opinions narrowly
interpreting the jurisdictional bar:
These courts believe that Congress envisioned a procedure that permits the EPA
to move expeditiously in the face of a potential environmental disaster. To
introduce the delay of court proceedings at the outset of a cleanup would conflict
with the strong Congressional policy that directs cleanups to occur prior to a
final determination of the partys' [sic] rights and liabilities under CERCLA.
Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Boarhead Corp.
v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1019 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The limits § 113(h) establishes are
designed to prevent time-consuming litigation from delaying the prompt clean-up of these
sites."); Alabama v. United States EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1560 (11th Cir. 1989) ("As the
legislative history indicates, Congress enacted this delay in judicial review to ensure
prompt and effective permanent cleanup of hazardous waste sites that threaten human
health and safety?'), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989); Reynolds v. Lujan, 785 F. Supp.
152, 153 (D.N.M. 1992) ('The purpose of § 113(h) is to ensure that judicial challenges
do not unnecessarily delay CERCLA cleanup actions?'); Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup
Emergency v. Reilly, 716 F. Supp. 828, 832 (D.N.J. 1989) ("Defendants cite SARA's
legislative history to show that Congress intended to foreclose pre-remedial review to
promote the policy of cleanup without delay?').
There are also broader policies underlying the mere avoidance of delay:
These policies include avoiding piecemeal court battles that would increase
response costs for all parties and waste EPA resources; allowing swift action
by the EPA to minimize physical harm to the environment by preventing
delays caused by litigation; deference to the EPA's decisions in the area of its
expertise; and the congressional determination that cleaning up potential
contamination is a more important goal than sorting out liability.
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action costs which are associated with dilatory litigation.4 4 How-

ever, from the beginning, this same legislative history acknowledges the difficulty in determining which lawsuits are legitimately
motivated by health or safety concerns and which are impermissibly
dilatory.45 It is precisely this determination that the Gamma-Tech
court was forced to make and precisely this issue that Congress
Richard D. Faulkner, Jr., Comment, CERCLA and the Constitution: Reardon v. United
States Permits ConstitutionalJurisdiction and Invalidates Federal Lien, 26 GA. L. REV.
861, 871 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
In spite of all Congress' best efforts, however, courts continue to face "the dominance of CERCLA litigation as the largest component of Environmental Litigation." David
Sive, Environmental Litigation in 1994: Procedural & Jurisdictional Matters, C981
A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 611, 613 (1995).
44. For a general discussion of the litigation costs associated with Superfund
litigation, see John J. Lyons, Deep Pockets and CERCLA: Should Superfund Liability be
Abolished?, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 271 (1986-87); see also Deason, supra note 8, at 589
("[E]xcessive transaction costs, especially those resulting from prolonged litigation, impede [CERCLA's] goals by delaying cleanups and depleting available resources. Logic
therefore dictates that mechanisms that can speed the litigation process will promote the
overall goals of CERCLA." (footnote omitted)). The costs of litigation have long been
seen as one of the most negative side effects of CERCLA:
One of the most troubling parts of Superfund is its unfair and highly litigious
liability system ....
As it now stands, the EPA typically orders the larger
polluters to clean up a site. They in turn sue smaller polluters, and their
insurance companies, to recover some of the costs .... This liability system
has become a cash cow for lawyers and has forced EPA and industry to spend
more time and money finding culprits than cleaning up contaminated sites.
Gergen, supra note 10, at 629 n.18 (quoting 140 CONG. REc. S1058-59 (daily ed. Feb. 7,
1994) (statement of Sen. Baucus)); see also Don J. DeBenedictis, How Superfund Money
is Spent, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 30, 30 (indicating that administration and litigation of
claims accounts for 88% of the insurance company money spent on CERCLA suits), cited
in Deason, supra note 8, at 559 n.26; Moore, supra note 31, at 678 ("The primary reason
offered for CERCLA's bar to pre-enforcement review of administrative orders is that under
many circumstances pre-enforcement review would delay the EPA's response to environmental emergencies and waste the agency's scarce time and resources on litigation."
(citations omitted)).
45. For instance, Senator Stafford stated:
Concerns have been expressed throughout the reauthorization process that
potentially responsible parties, in the guise of aggrieved citizens, might also
take advantage of such opportunities for judicial review. If these fears were
realized, such specious suits would slow cleanup and enable private parties to
avoid or at least delay paying their fair share of cleanup costs.
To avoid such results, the courts must draw appropriate distinctions between
dilatory or other unauthorized lawsuits by potentially responsible parties
involving only monetary damages and legitimate citizens' suits complaining
of irreparable injury that can be only addressed only if a claim is heard during
or prior to response action ....
• . . The crucial distinction between these two types of suits is that
plaintiffs concerned with the monetary consequences of a response can be
made whole after the cleanup is completed .... But citizens asserting a true
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should now address by statute as part of a comprehensive CERCLA
reform.
I.

APPLICATION OF THE JURISDICTIONAL BAN

A. Pre-SARA Litigation

Arguably, when Congress passed the SARA amendments adding the jurisdictional bar to CERCLA, it merely codified the patterns that had developed in the CERCLA cases decided prior to

SARA. 46 As originally drafted, CERCLA did not unequivocally and
47
explicitly bar pre-enforcement judicial review of remedial actions.
However, a series of cases prior to the passage of SARA-includpublic health or environmental interest in the response cannot obtain adequate
relief if an inadequate cleanup is allowed to proceed ....
132 CONG. REc. S14,898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Stafford); see also
id. at 14917-18 (statement of Sen. Mitchell):
[A]n entire cleanup need not be complete before a citizen can sue. Similarly,
responsible parties cannot halt cleanup because of concerns that the cleanup
is excessive.
Clearly the risk to the public health is more of an irreparable injury than
the momentary loss of money. If a response action is proven to be too
expensive, responsible parties can be reimbursed by the fund for the excess
cost. The public, however, has no recourse if their health has been impaired.
For this reason, courts should carefully weigh the equities and give great
weight to the public health risks involved.
Id.
46. See Dickerson v. EPA Adm'r, 834 F.2d 974, 977-78 (11th Cir. 1987) ("A recent
amendment to CERCLA... clearly provides that federal courts do not have subject matter
jurisdiction for pre-enforcement reviews of EPA removal actions .

. .

. This legislation

reflects Congress' intent to preclude pre-enforcement judicial review and is consistent with
earlier cases barring such review?'); 132 CONG. REc. H9582 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986)
(remarks of Rep. Glickman) ("In essence, new section 113(h) of CERCLA ratifies existing
case law on the timing of review and establishes the circumstances under which courts
will have jurisdiction to review response actions?'); 132 CONG. Rac. S14,928 (daily ed.
Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond) ("It is my understanding that the provision
confirms and builds upon existing case law?'); see also the discussion of Southern Pines
Assocs. v. United States, 912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990), infra note 63.
For a general discussion of the ways in which the jurisdictional bar in the SARA
amendments was connected to the pre-SARA common law on the subject, consult Light,
The Importance of "Being Taken", supra note 5, at 15-19.
47. See Cheryl Kessler Clark, Due Process and the Environmental Lien: The Need
for Legislative Reform, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 203, 216 (1993) ("Prior to the
enactment of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),
CERCLA did not expressly prohibit pre-enforcement judicial review of EPA actions?').
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ing Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. United States EPA,48 Wagner Seed

Co. v. Daggett,49 Barnes v. United States District Court,50 United
States v. Outboard Marine,51 Wheaton Industries v. United States
53
EPA,5 2 Lone Pine Steering Committee v. United States EPA, J.V
48. 812 E2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987). In this case, the Court of Appeals entertained the
plaintiff's constitutional challenge to CERCLA's scheme of treble damages. Id. at 386.
However, regarding a review of the substantive merits of the ordered cleanup, the Court
of Appeals stated, "We agree with the district court's decision that it lacked jurisdiction
to review the merits of an EPA clean-up order prior to an attempt by the EPA to enforce
it' Id. at 386 n.1.
49. 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986). As in Solid State Circuits, the Wagner Seed court
determined that it had jurisdiction to entertain constitutional challenges to the CERCLA
scheme. Id. at 314. It found these challenges to be "without merit." Id. at 317. However,
it ruled that "[t]he district court's order denying appellant's motion for a preliminary
injunction must be affirmed. It properly held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
consider a challenge on the merits to an EPA order before the EPA had initiated an
enforcement action.' Id.
50. 800 F.2d 822, 822 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that "[tihe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act... does not authorize pre-enforcement
review of Environmental Protection Agency orders").
51. 789 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 961 (1986). The Outboard
Marine court reported that:
Courts that have addressed the issue of a trial court's jurisdiction to review
the appropriateness of the EPA's removal efforts have held that CERCLA does
not authorize pre-enforcement judicial review of the EPA's R.O.D .....
Rather, these courts have held that the jurisdiction rests with the trial court
only after the EPA has enforced the R.O.D. and the government subsequently
sues under CERCLA . . .to recover the cleanup costs incurred in enforcing
the R.O.D.
OutboardMarine, 789 F.2d at 505-06.
52. 781 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1986). Here, the court agreed that "the district court
correctly ruled that judicial review was not available under section 104 of CERCLA at
this time.' Id. at 356. Thus, the court refused to entertain the plaintiff's argument that it
should review the EPA/DEP's refusal to allow Wheaton to perform the remedial investigation/feasibility study. Id. The court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the plaintiff's argument that the Administrative Procedure Act generally favors judicial review of
agency action. As the court reasoned, this "argument fails to take into account the effect
of the provision of the APA itself that precludes judicial review under the APA whenever
the relevant statute precludes judicial review?' Id. at 356. Hence, the jurisdictional bar in
CERCLA "trumps" the general administrative law preference for judicial review.
53. 777 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986). The Lone Pine
plaintiffs raised a number of challenges to an EPA ordered cleanup action. Specifically,
they alleged that "the EPA's plan was too costly, the agency had failed to evaluate
adequately the Committee's proposal, and the Record of Decision contained inaccurate
technical data and erroneous assumptions resulting in duplicative and unnecessary corrective measures?' Id. at 884. Although the district court granted the government's motion to
dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction, see Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. United States
EPA, 600 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1985), the plaintiffs advanced a number of arguments on
appeal that supported the court's review. Specifically, they contended that they would be
disadvantaged in post-enforcement litigation because EPA would be able to demonstrate
the efficacy of the plan actually undertaken. Thus, they argued that they would be unable
to make a convincing showing after the fact that their theoretical proposal would have
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5 4 Pacific Resins
Peters & Co. v. Administrator,
& Chems., Inc. v.
55
United States, B.R. MacKay & Sons v. United States,5 6 Wagner
Electric Corp. v. Thomas,57 and Aminoil, Inc. v. United States EPA5 8- -

made it clear that the courts perceived such a ban to have been
Congress' unwritten intent.5 9 Indeed, many of the decisions issued

immediately prior to the actual passage of the statutory ban in
been just as good if it had been selected. See Lone Pine, 777 F.2d at 885. In addition, they
pointed out that there was no emergency existing at the cleanup site that justified
immediate action without the possibility of review. Id.
However, the Lone Pine court found that § 9604 of CERCLA implicitly prevented
the court from reviewing an EPA cleanup plan prior to its completion. The court concluded
that "although not explicitly stated in the statute, we find in § 9604 an implicit disapproval
of pre-enforcement judicial review. That policy decision is not limited to emergency
situations but applies to remedial actions as well.' Id. at 887.
54. 767 F.2d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 1985) ("Pre-enforcement review would lead to
considerable delay in providing cleanups, would increase response costs, and would
discourage settlements and voluntary cleanups.").
55. 654 F. Supp. 249, 253 (W.D. Wash. 1986) ('The most recent appellate and
district court decisions addressing the issue have concluded there is no pre-enforcement
review under CERCLA.").
56. 633 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Utah 1986). This case arose in an atypical procedural
posture. The EPA's cleanup action had been completed. However, the government had not
brought its cost-recovery action. The plaintiffs sought to litigate the issue of liability prior
to the government's filing of the cost-recovery suit. Id. at 1292. This case would seem to
be an ideal example for allowing the court to have jurisdiction since the goal of the bar-to
prevent dilatory tactics from delaying needed cleanups-could, by definition, not be
thwarted by disallowing recovery after the cleanup has taken place. Nevertheless, the
Mackay court took very seriously the "shooting first and asking questions later" philosophy
underlying CERCLA. See id. at 1294. Thus, it dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for lack
of jurisdiction.
57. 612 F. Supp. 736 (D. Kan. 1985). As with Solid State Circuits and Wagner Seed,
the court here determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the constitutional challenges to
CERCLA. Id. at 741. However, it found that it lacked jurisdiction under CERCLA to do
a pre-enforcement review of the subject matter merits of the complaint. It explained,
"[T]he reported district court decisions are virtually unanimous in holding that a federal
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the merits of a CERCLA order prior to
EPA's seeking to enforce that order." Id. at 740.
58. 599 F. Supp. 69 (C.D. Cal. 1984). Again, the court here found it had jurisdiction
to hear the constitutional challenges to CERCLA but determined that "to the extent that
pre-enforcement review of the merits of the administrative order is sought, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear the arguments raised by plaintiffs." Id. at 71.
59. See Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 563. In commenting on these pre-SARA cases,
the author observes:
Prior to SARA's enactment, courts applying CERCLA to PRP suits for
pre-enforcement review of EPA cleanup generally determined that CERCLA
precludes judicial review of Agency cleanup actions until after the cleanup
actions were completed . .

.

.The courts reasoned that although CERCLA

does not expressly prohibit pre-enforcement judicial review of the cleanup
actions, the legislative history of CERCLA indicates that Congress intended
to enable EPA to cleanup hazardous waste sites without such judicial encumbrances. The decisions interpreted CERCLA in accordance with both Congress' legislative intent and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which
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that the courts'
SARA used that pending legislation as evidence
60
accurate.
was
intent
Congress'
assessment of
Some pre-SARA cases did allow for review of proposed actions when it was the constitutionality of CERCLA itself that was

at issue. 61 However, when plaintiffs sought review of the actual
details of a particular cleanup plan, such review was consistently
denied.

62

Given this set of precedents, it is fair to say that once section
9613(h) was added to CERCLA, it merely reaffirmed what courts
throughout the early eighties had already decided the jurisdictional
rule should be.63 Through the use of legislation, however, Congress
provides that agency decisions are not "ripe" for judicial review unless they
are "final actions."
Id.
60. See, e.g., Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. United States EPA, 812 F.2d 383, 386 (8th
Cir. 1987) ("The October, 1986, amendments to CERCLA confirm Congress' intent to
preclude pre-enforcement review."). However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals correctly
refused to accept an argument based on the pending SARA legislation, explaining, "The
legislation is still pending and may undergo additional changes before passage. Hence, we
do not rely on it here." Wheaton Indus. v. United States EPA, 781 F.2d 354, 356"n.1 (3d
Cir. 1986). The Wheaton decision followed the Third Circuit's decision in Lone Pine
Steering Comm. v. United States EPA, 777 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 476 U.S.
1115 (1986), by displaying an ambivalent attitude toward claims that pending legislation
constitutes an expression of intent. Although the Lone Pine court began by saying, "we
do not rely on [the bills] since they have not been approved by both Houses," it went on
to concede that "the proposed legislation and its legislative history are instructive on the
question of pre-enforcement judicial review." Id. at 888.
61. Fuller discussion of this aspect of the jurisdictional bar may be found in William,
A. Montgomery, Jr., ConstitutionalImplications of CERCLA: Due Process Challenges to
Response Costs and Retroactive Liability, 31 WASH. U. J. URa. & CONTEMP. L. 279
(1987).
62. There was one notable exception to this line of cases. In Outboard Marine Corp.
v. Thomas, 773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1985), vacated, 479 U.S. 1002, the court heard a
challenge to EPA's alleged right to enter plaintiff's property to do "the field work necessary
to prepare the design plans and specifications for the anticipated clean-up construction."
Id. at 887. This "field work" involved a large tract of land not alleged to be contaminated.
Id. at 887-88. After the plaintiff refused to allow the EPA access, the agency was granted
a warrant for administrative entry; the plaintiff refused access even with the warrant and
moved to quash the warrant. The district court denied the plaintiff's request for this
injunctive relief. Id. at 888. However, the court of appeals reversed and granted the
plaintiff an injunction against EPA entry. Id. at 891. The court's action in this case,
however, should not be seen as an early departure from the jurisdictional ban. Rather, the
rationale for the court's decision centered around its finding that EPA had not yet obtained
clear authority to begin the cleanup at all. Because the intrusive entry it proposed was so
related to the conduct of the cleanup construction project, the court reasoned that without
authority to do the cleanup, EPA lacked authority to engage in activities integrally
intertwined with the cleanup. Id. at 889. However, had the EPA been authorized to do the
underlying cleanup, the court may well have been subject to the jurisdictional bar.
63. In Southern Pines Assocs. v. United States, 912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990), the
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was able to state the rule in clearer terms than the common law

was able to. Accordingly, until Gamma-Tech, the SARA amendments resulted in court decisions almost uniformly stating that the
federal courts cannot engage in pre-enforcement review of EPA's
64
cleanup orders.

B. Post-SARA Litigation Leading Up to Gamma-Tech

In various ways and in different procedural postures, the past
ten years have seen a clear line of post-SARA cases continuing to
disfavor challenges to cleanup plans. It is because these cases have

been so consistent and so adamant that the Gamma-Tech ruling is
so noteworthy.

65

A core of oft-cited cases has established the foundation for the
prevailing narrow reading of the jurisdictional bar in section
9613(h). 66 Through their reliance on legislative history, strict
interpretation of the statutory language, and fervent appeal to the
sound policy of speedy cleanups, the courts in these cases have

forbidden pre-enforcement review in a wide variety of circumstances. Perhaps the most vehemently stringent interpretation of

the bar came from the Third Circuit in Boarhead Corp. v. Erickcourt discussed the way in which the SARA amendments appear to "rubberstamp" the
approach the courts had already decided to take with regard to the jurisdictional bar:
Prior to 1986 courts held that pre-enforcement remedial actions taken by the
EPA under CERCLA were not subject to judicial review because litigation
would interfere with CERCLA's policy of prompt agency response .

. .

. In

1986 Congress added a provision to CERCLA which specifically precludes
federal jurisdiction over pre-enforcement remedial action.
Id. at 716.
64. Interestingly, the jurisdictional bar in SARA was based on the limitation that
was read into CERCLA by the pre-SARA courts. Similarly, now Congress should follow
a model presented by a court as basis for its legislation. Obviously, this analogy may be
a bit strained since the pre-SARA decisions claimed to be reading into CERCLA what
they claimed to know Congress really meant. Nevertheless, it still provides an interesting
example of legislative/judicial dialog and demonstrates the times when it is in the
legislature's interest to follow the lead of the court.
65. Equally important, the dissatisfaction that many courts express when applying
the rule illustrates that their adamant consistency does not come from uniform satisfaction.
Rather, the courts seem to be doing with displeasure what they believe the statute requires
them to do. Thus, this lack of judicial debate should not be seen as an argument favoring
legislative inaction in this area.
66. See discussion infra notes 75-88 and accompanying text, describing the key
cases in this line.
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son.67 There, EPA had developed a CERCLA cleanup plan for
property on which the plaintiffs alleged "American Indian remains
and artifacts" 68 were found. The plaintiffs challenged EPA's authority to conduct its proposed cleanup without reviewing the plan as
required under applicable provisions of the National Historic Preservation Act.69 Failing to allow plaintiffs to challenge the cleanup,
they argued, would violate the Preservation Act and would allow
potentially irreparable harm to irreplaceable cultural artifacts. 70 In
response, the government argued that allowing the review would
71
violate the jurisdictional bar as set forth in CERCLA.
Although the Boarhead court expressed sympathy for the irreparable harm that might arise if it could not hear the plaintiffs'
claim, 72 it ruled that its ability to prevent that harm was limited by
CERCLA's plain language. Accordingly, the court unenthusiastically upheld the district court's finding that it lacked jurisdiction
to review the cleanup:
Although post-study judicial review cannot rectify damage to
historical artifacts or remains on this landmark site that occurs
in the course of the EPA's clean-up, we must presume Congress
balanced the problem of irreparable harm to such interests and
concluded that the interest in removing the hazard of toxic
waste from Superfund sites outweighed it.
Boarhead's remedy
73
lies with Congress, not the district court.
Thus, in weighing the difficult problem of reconciling the statutory
requirement with the reality of irreversible harm, the Boarhead
67. 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991).

68. Id. at 1013.
69. Id. The National Historic Preservation Act, § 106, as amended, 16 U.S.C.
§ 470(f) provides, in relevant part, that those responsible for federally assisted undertakings-of which a CERCLA cleanup is, obviously, an example-must:
[P]rior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the
undertaking or prior to the issuance of any license, as the case may be, take
into account the effect of the undertaking on any district site, building,
structure, or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National
Register.
Id., cited in Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1013 n.2.
70. Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1014.
71. Id. at 1018.
72. Of course, unlike Gamma-Tech, the Boarhead case did not involve irreparable
harm to either health or the environment.
73. Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1023.
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of Congress,
court concluded that it must defer to the judgment
74
even where undesirable consequences may result.

In cases that were somewhat less dramatic than Boarhead, a
number of other post-SARA courts have also rejected plaintiffs'

attempts to broaden the jurisdictional scope of CERCLA. For example, in Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Reilly,75 Arkansas Peace Center v. Arkansas Department of Pollution Control & Ecology,76 North
74. For further discussion of the Boarhead decision, see Nathan H. Steams, Comment, Cleaning Up the Mess, or Messing Up the Cleanup: Does CERCLA's Jurisdictional
Bar (Section 113(h)) Prohibit Citizen Suits Brought Under RCRA, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 49, 71-72 (1994). Unlike Gamma-Tech, the Boarhead case did not involve
irreparable harm to health or the environment. Nevertheless, resolving the conflict between
the possibility of irreversible harm and the statutory requirement is the cornerstone issue
in Gamma-Tech. The Gamma-Tech case is discussed in detail infra part IV.
75. 927 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1991). In this case, the court rejected an argument that
the plaintiff should be able to make constitutional challenges to CERCLA without being
subject to the pre-enforcement restrictions. The court found this argument unpersuasive
because "[t]he CERCLA statutory scheme, as amended by SARA, merely serves to
effectuate a delay in a plaintiff's ability to have a full hearing on the issue of liability and
does not substantively affect the adequacy of such a hearing." Id. at 295. This case appears
to contradict the court's holding in Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991)
discussed infra note 115. However, the Barmet court is very careful to explain that
Reardon is only narrowly applicable to its facts. Barmet, 927 F.2d at 295.
76. 999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994). Here, the
plaintiffs filed a complaint and a motion for a preliminary injunction that would enjoin a
proposed removal plan involving incineration of dioxin. This injunctive relief was granted
in part by the trial court. Arkansas Peace Ctr., 999 F.2d at 1215. Later, the lower court
granted "a preliminary injunction barring all incineration of drums of hazardous wastes
that had not already been shredded... ' Id. At issue on appeal was the validity of that
injunction. The arguments against the injunction were based in part on the EPA's claim
that the lower court could not grant the preliminary injunction because it lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 1216. The court accepted this argument, finding two parts of it especially
compelling. First, the court considered the fact that the statute itself allows a challenge to
a removal or remedial action only where "the removal or remedial action taken ... was
in violation of any requirement of [CERCLA]." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4)). As
the EPA argued, this passage uses the past tense in referring to the removal and remedial
actions that may be challenged. Thus, the court accepted the premise that Congress could
not have intended to allow challenges to ongoing cleanups because, grammatically, the
past tense requires that the cleanup be completed. See id. at 1216-17. In ruling this way,
the court explicitly rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the case should be heard as a
claim involving a RCRA violation separate and distinct from the CERCLA claim. See id.
at 1217.
A more detailed analysis of Arkansas Peace Ctr. may be found in Steams, supra
note 74, at 76-78. See also Court Dismisses Case that Sought to Bar Burning of Dioxin
Waste at Superfund Site, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 520 (July 23, 1993). The petition
for certiorari to the Supreme Court in this case is discussed in Supreme Court May Decide
on Challenges to CERCLA Cleanups, HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, Mar. 21, 1994, available
in Westlaw, HAZWN File, WL 2516099; PetitionersSeek Supreme Court Review on State
Regulation of Superfund Sites, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1722-23 (Feb. 4, 1994);
Supreme Court Asked to Decide RCRA Applicability to Superfund, PESTICIDE & Toxic
CHEMICAL NEWS, Jan. 12, 1994, availablein Westlaw, PTCHEMN File, WL 2524422. The
Supreme Court's decision not to grant the petition is discussed in Supreme Court Declines
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Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 77 Schalk v. Reilly, 78 Voluntary Purchasing
Groups v. Reilly, 79 Alabama v. United States EPA,80 In re CombusReview of Ruling that Dismissed Suit Over Vertac Cleanup, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 49,
at 2068 (Apr. 8, 1994).
77. 930 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The district court was in any event right
that the suit is blocked by the blunt withdrawal of federal jurisdiction in section 113(h).
The withdrawal applies only to removal and to remedial actions, but the construction of
the new slip is remedial."). However, the North Shore Gas court seemed ambivalent about
ruling as it did, reflecting that "the breadth of section 113(h) is troublesome." Id. at 1245.
78. 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Frey v. Reilly, 498 U.S. 981 (1990).
In Schalk, the plaintiffs challenged a cleanup plan that would involve the incineration of
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) pursuant to a consent decree with a responsible party.
Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1093-94. In particular, the plaintiffs objected to the fact that this plan
was put in place without prior preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement as
required by the National Environmental Policy Act. Id. at 1094. However, the court ruled
that "federal court review of the remedial action proposed . . . is explicitly barred by
CERCLA's plain language." Id. at 1095. The court was particularly concerned that
subjecting all CERCLA cleanups to Environmental Impact Statements and Feasibility
Studies would cause a great deal of dilatory maneuvering. See id. In reaching this
conclusion, the court also rejected arguments by the plaintiffs that the SARA amendments
should not be applied retroactively, and that the action they were bringing was not truly
a "challenge" of the type covered by the statute. Id. at 1096. For further discussion of
Schalk, see Paul H. McConnell, Note, CERCLA Wrestling-Grappling with Conflicting
Legislative Intent and the Citizens' Suit Provision-United States v. Princeton GammaTech, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 115, 125-26 (1995).
79. 889 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1989). In this opinion, the court found that SARA
prohibited "review prior to the issue of liability prior to the filing of a cost-recovery action
by the government" Id. at 1389. The opinion spends a great deal of time explaining why
such a restrictive view of SARA is wise. The court began by invoking the traditional
argument that the goal of the SARA provision was to prevent delay in implementing
remedies. See id. at 1390. The court acknowledged that in this case the review sought
would not necessarily result in delay. However, the court identified reasons other than mere
delay to read § 113 strictly. The court explained that any other result would create two
additional indirect harms:
[I]t would force the EPA-against the wishes of Congress-to engage in
'piecemeal' litigation and use its resources to protect its rights to recover from
any PRP filing such a declaratory judgment action ....
[M]uch of the EPA's
time and resources could end up being allocated to litigation in this area ....
Moreover, the crazy quilt litigation that could result from allowing PRPs to file
suits for declaratory judgments of non-liability prior to the initiation of government cost-recovery actions could force the EPA to confront inconsistent results.
Id. at 1390.
Thus, Voluntary PurchasingGroups undercuts any argument by a plaintiff that only
claims directly harming the cleanup process should be precluded. The mere fact that delay
will not occur in a particular case will not justify pre-enforcement review. This aspect of
the case is discussed more fully in Court Finds No Pre-Enforcement Review Even Where
CERCLA Remedy Already Completed, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 1445-46 (Dec. 29,
1989).
80. 871 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989). The court
here found that there was no pre-enforcement jurisdiction over such cases by attaching the
same significance to the statutory use of the past tense that the Arkansas Peace Ctr court
did:
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tion Equipment Associates,"l Reynolds v. Lujan,12 Redland Soccer
Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army,83 Cooper Industries v. United
The plain language of the statute indicates that section 113(h)(4) applies only
after a remedial action is actually completed. The section refers in the past
tense to remedial actions taken under section 104 or secured under section
106. Absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, this language is conclusive.
Alabama v. United States EPA, 871 F.2d at 1557. For further discussion of the Alabama
decision, see FederalAppeals Court Lifts Injunction,Allows Shipment of Waste to Alabama
Site, 13 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 164 (May 5, 1989); McConnell, supra note 78, at 126.
81. 838 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1988). In this case, the court faced an interesting tension
between the goals of the bankruptcy laws and those of CERCLA. The plaintiffs essentially
sought a declaratory judgment discharging their liability for a cleanup under CERCLA. This
would assist them in their bankruptcy proceedings to determine their financial obligations.
See id. at 37. As the court acknowledged, bankruptcy proceedings have as one of their goals
early litigation "allowing a bankruptcy judge to estimate contingent liabilities ... thereby
fixing them for the purpose of sharing in the assets of the estate before they would have
otherwise matured?' Id. at 37 (citation omitted). In contrast, CERCLA "embraced a policy
of delaying litigation about cleanup costs until after the cleanup." Id. This dichotomy
naturally produced a tension. Reflecting the strong presumption in favor of a strict reading
of CERCLA, the court resolved the tension in favor of avoiding delay under CERCLA:
If the EPA is forced to expend its resources on preserving its rights to eventual
recovery against any PRP that has recently emerged from bankruptcy, the EPA
will have less ability to pursue its primary mission of cleaning the sites. Of
course, any time an agency is forced to litigate it expends funds it might
otherwise have used to further its primary purpose, but, as already discussed,
Congress has directed the courts to be especially wary of interfering with
CERCLA work ....
Id. at 40. Thus, In re Combustion Equip. clearly illustrates that the courts are willing to
interpret the restrictions narrowly even if that may undermine the legitimate policy
objectives of other federal statutes.
82. 785 F Supp. 152 (D.N.M. 1992). Illustrating that the jurisdictional ban should
be read in a way that eliminates as many "loopholes" for plaintiffs as possible, the court
here held that § 113(h) barred it from hearing a challenge even though the plaintiffs made
their challenge to the cleanup under RCRA rather than CERCLA. As the court explained,
"The language of § 113(h) is broad. It precludes 'any challenges' rather than specified
actions and goes beyond CERCLA itself since there shall be no federal jurisdiction under
any federal or state law." Id. at 153.
83. 801 F. Supp. 1432 (M.D. Pa. 1992). Here, the court granted motions to dismiss
two citizens suits challenging EPA actions taken pursuant to CERCLA. In dismissing the
federal claim the court reasoned that "[b]oth the plain language and the legislative history
indicate a broad congressional intent that federal courts not hear such challenges until the
remedial actions are complete." Id. at 1435. More interesting, however, was the court's
parallel dismissal of challenges to the cleanup brought under Pennsylvania state law. The
court held that the "claims brought under state environmental protection statutes must be
dismissed along with CERCLA claims .... Were we to do otherwise, we would frustrate
the legislative intent behind § 9613(h)." Id. at 1436. Thus, the Redland court employed
§ 9613(h) to close off another avenue of potential litigation. For further discussion of the
Redland decision, see Suit Dismissed Pending Cleanup of PennsylvaniaHazardous Waste
Site, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1645-46 (Oct. 23, 1992).
However, Redland was not the final word on the complex question of CERCLA's
relationship to state law. For further discussion of that issue, see the discussion of United
States v. Colorado accompanying infra note 117.
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States EPA,84 City of Eureka v. United States, 5 Frey v. Thomas,8 6
and South Macomb DisposalAuthority v. United States EPA8 7 courts
84. 775 F. Supp. 1027 (W.D. Mich. 1991). Here, the court faced a challenge that
did not go to the substantive merits of a response action; rather, the plaintiff objected to
the process of selecting the response. Id. at 1038. The thrust of the plaintiff's argument
was that because the challenge concerned remedy selection rather than remedial action,
the jurisdictional bar should not apply. Id. The court rejected this argument, finding that
the difference was semantic rather than real:
[W]here the underlying principle of the bar to pre-enforcement review is the
need to prevent litigation that may delay rapid cleanup, the principle is no
less applicable where a party seeks injunctive relief on the eve of the EPA's
remedy selection and Record of Decision. Pre-enforcement judicial review,
whether before or after the selection of a remedy, thwarts the purpose of
prompt response intended by CERCLA.
Id. at 1039.
85. 770 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (granting government's motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
86. No. IP88-948-C, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16967 (S.D. Ind. 1988). Here, the court
rejected a challenge to a remedial action that was based on the claim that the process by
which the remedy was pursued violated the Environmental Impact Statement requirement
of the National Environmental Policy Act. The court rejected this claim, finding that the
conflict should be covered by the CERCLA ban:
NEPA is not CERCLA, and is in a different chapter of the United States Code.
Thus, SARA's citizen's suit provision cannot be used to compel a federal
official to perform an act allegedly required by NEPA .

. .

. [B]ecause the

citizen's suit provision does not encompass NEPA, the Court finds no jurisdictional basis for plaintiffs' allegation under NEPA.

Id. at *7.
Although this would significantly reduce plaintiffs' ability to challenge the details
of proposed plans, the court justified this outcome by explaining that the same statute that
created the strict jurisdictional bar also provided extensive opportunities for citizen
involvement in selecting the actual cleanup plan. Id. Frey v. Thomas is discussed in Federal
Court Should Have Reviewed Remedy in Indiana PCB Site Case, Supreme Court Told, 21
Env't Rptr. (BNA) No. 20, at 905 (Sept. 14, 1990).
87. 681 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Mich. 1988). In a marked departure from earlier cases
that allowed courts significant leeway to hear constitutional challenges to the jurisdictional
bar, the South Macomb Disposalcourt refused to hear a constitutional challenge to the bar
on judicial review. Id. at 1245. As the court reasoned, while there are substantive
differences between a constitutional challenge and a fact-specific challenge, the net result
of both is a delay in the cleanup. Finding the congressional sentiment against such delays
to be so compelling, the court ruled:
[Tihe court holds that Congress intended that federal courts not have subjectmatter jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to CERCLA at this stage
of the proceedings under the Act. To hold otherwise would allow the filing of
lawsuits that would impede the EPA's ability to clean up hazardous waste sites
promptly and expeditiously. If the court were to consider the constitutionality
of CERCLA, an injunction would have to issue to prevent any potentially
unconstitutional actions from taking place. Such injunctions are precisely the
type of impediment that the preenforcement review was meant to prohibit.
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rejected plaintiffs' attempts to broaden the jurisdictional scope of
88
CERCLA.
In addition to these cases, several decisions warrant special
notice. In particular, the court in Hanford Downwinders Coalition,
Inc. v. Dowdle' 9 specifically rejected a health-related challenge to
a removal action. In Hanford Downwinders Coalition,the plaintiffs
sought an injunction to prevent the Agency for Toxic Substances
& Disease Registry (ATSDR) 90 from spending any further funds
on Hanford, a federal Superfund site, until the agency completed
a required health assessment of the location. 9 1 Predictably, the
defendant moved to dismiss, saying that the court's review of
the plaintiffs' claim was barred by the timing of review restrictions in section 113(h).92 The plaintiffs made four arguments in
favor of having the court grant review. The first three were procedural arguments turning on the definitions of the jurisdictional
94
bar.93 The court rejected these three arguments.

However, the plaintiffs' fourth argument is the most relevant

for this Article. Plaintiffs argued that section 113 should not bar
Id. at 1251.
88. See also Dickerson v. EPA Adm'r, 834 F.2d 974, 977 (11th Cir. 1987) ("CERCLA precludes pre-enforcement judicial review of EPA response actions."); Environmental
Waste Control, Inc. v. Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, 763 F. Supp. 1576
(N.D. Ga. 1991) (dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiff's challenge
to remedy based on its allegedly deficient Health Assessment); United States v. M. Genzale
Plating, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 877 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejecting both factual and constitutional
challenges to jurisdictional ban).
89. 841 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. Wash. 1993), aff'd, 71 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1995).
90. For a fuller discussion of the role of the Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry
under CERCLA, see Gaba & Kelly, supra note 31, at 943-45; and Siegel, supra note 9.
91. Hanford Downwinders Coalition, 841 F. Supp. at 1054-55. Specifically, the
plaintiffs requested "declaratory relief as to [the] alleged failures of duty . . . clarification
regarding the appropriate means for accessing authorized funds, and an accounting ...
[and] an injunction against any further spending by the ATSDR at Hanford until plaintiffs
obtain the declaratory relief, clarification, and accounting they seek.' Id. at 1056.
92. Id.
93. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that § 113(h) should not bar review because:
-their claim "does not 'challenge' a removal action because it does not seek
to enjoin any ongoing activities but merely to enforce the obligation to take
further actions:' Id. at 1057.
-their claim is permissible because "the health assessment is a distinct stage
of the removal action that has been completed or taken.' Id.
-their claim would not undermine the goal of preventing delays in cleanup
activities. Id.
94. See id. at 1059-61.
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their request for review because their challenge did not involve a
monetary claim but, instead, was "health related. 95 They argued
that "the legislative history suggests that health related challenges
should be allowed even though challenges based on monetary harm
are barred.' 96 While the HanfordDownwinders Coalition plaintiffs
were correct in arguing that monetary claims seem most antithetical to Congress' intent,97 the court still felt constrained to reject
plaintiffs' argument because Congress did not authorize a healthrelated exception to the general jurisdictional bar. As the court
logically reasoned:
Congress was aware of citizen suits when it drafted section
113(h) ....Congress was aware of the timing of review issue
when it provided for citizen suits. Despite this clear awareness
that citizen suits were subject to the timing of review restrictions of section 113(h), Congress provided no exception to
section 113(h) for health related claims. 98
In part, this strict view appears to have been motivated by fear that
allowing such an exception would open the floodgates to litigation.
As a realistic matter, "[m]any section 113(h) cases have confronted
claims that were based on threats to human health."99 Thus, the
court acknowledged, however reluctantly, 10 0 that the intent of Con95. Id. at 1062.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. The court expressed its dissatisfaction with the decision it was compelled to
make:
Harsh as this result may be, it is compelled by the severely restrictive
language Congress has chosen to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Remedy for this harm must be sought with Congress, who should by now be
well aware of how the courts have unanimously interpreted section 113(h)
As the court has noted before, the equities of the situation at Hanford make
section 113(h)'s harsh jurisdictional limitations particularly troubling ....
Nevertheless, Congress, through enacting section 113(h), has determined
that the courts are not the appropriate forum for directing response actions at
Superfund sites . . . .Accordingly, unless Congress amends CERCLA, this
court cannot substitute its judgement for that of Congress and may not review
the agency actions underway at Hanford.
Id. at 1063. It is precisely this need for Congressional action that this Article advocates.
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gress and the interest in avoiding dilatory and open-ended litigation
required it to uphold the bar.10 1
The strict reading of the jurisdictional bar was also upheld in
Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v. Reilly,10 2 another case
in which the court declined to create any exception for claims of
potentially irreparable harm to health. 103 In Neighborhood Toxic
Cleanup Emergency, the plaintiffs claimed that "if implementation
of the current remedial plan goes forward without further study,10it4
could pose a health hazard to residents living near the landfill.
The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief that would temporarily halt
the proposed cleanup until the information was gathered and considered. 10 5 Before the court could consider this request for relief, it
found that it was first necessary to determine whether the jurisdictional bar precluded review, even though health considerations were
implicated. The court determined that while lifting the bar for
health reasons "might make good sense as a matter of policy,"' 06 it
could not do so because, again, "the most authoritative legislative
history supports the view that a citizens suit cannot lie until at least
one phase of the clean-up is completed." 07
Interestingly, in positing that such an exception should exist,
the plaintiffs in Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency made an
argument that directly foreshadowed the theory that would ultimately prevail in Gamma-Tech 05 They reasoned, "Congress's ultimate goal in enacting CERCLA/SARA is to safeguard the public
from hazardous waste and . . . an unsafe cleanup would subvert
that goal."'1 9 However, the court here, as in Hanford Downwinders

Coalition, felt constrained to rule that the current jurisdictional bar
deprived it of any authority to adjudicate the merits of the plaintiffs' claim." 0 In so ruling, the court also rejected arguments that
101. See id.
102. 716 F. Supp. 828 (D.N.J. 1989).

103. For further discussion of Neighborhood Toxic CleanupEmergency, see McConnell, supra note 78, at 126-27.
104. Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency, 716 F. Supp. at 829. The thrust of
the plaintiffs' complaint was that the EPA had not gathered sufficient information about
the potential health risks before deciding on a plan, and thus it was uncertain whether the

safety procedures at the cleanup site would be adequate. Id. at 829-30.
105. Id. at 830.
106. Id. at 833.

107. Id. at 834.
108. Gamma-Tech is discussed in detail infra part IV.

109. Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency, 716 F. Supp. at 834.
110. See id. at 837.
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the potentially irreparable harm that may arise from the jurisdictional bar might constitute a due process violation."' The court was
relatively unsympathetic to this argument since it found clear evidence that Congress intended to postpone judicial review and that
a wide range of alternative remedies were available to plaintiffs." 2
Thus, these cases reveal a clear pattern of decisions in which
courts" read the jurisdictional bar very strictly both prior to and
after the passage of the SARA amendments." 3 This strictness is
evident both in cases involving health threats and in those that do
not. This history illustrates the dramatic departure from the traditional rule which came in the Gamma-Tech decision and demonstrates the major effect that legislative reform in this area could
have on CERCLA litigation.
C. Court-CreatedExceptions Prior to Gamma-Tech

There have been some exceptions to this strict reading of the
rule. In various cases courts have refused to allow the bar's retroactive application;" 4 found that the judiciary does have authority
to determine the constitutionality of a CERCLA lien;"' and ruled
11. See id.
112. See id. at 835. Specifically, the court identified five avenues of relief that
remained open:
A person's rights to challenge the choice of removal or remedial action are
preserved, however, and can be exercised when an action is taken against a
responsible party to recover response costs of damages under section 107, an
action to enforce an order to perform response actions, an action for reimbursement for cleanup costs expended by a person order [sic] than the
Administrator, a citizen suit alleging that the removal or remedial action was
in violation of any requirement of the Act, and an action under section 106
by the United States to secure injunctive relief.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 253(V), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26 (1986), reprintedin, 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3148-49).
113. The courts have also used this line of precedents to create an analogy allowing
strict interpretation of the jurisdictional bar in other environmental statutes as well. See,
e.g., Southern Pines Assocs. v. United States, 912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990) (discussing
jurisdictional bar in Clean Air Act); Hoffman Group, Inc. v. United States EPA, 902 F.2d
567 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing jurisdictional bar in Clean Water Act).
114. See O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 807, 818 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
("[I]n the rare circumstances in which substantial remedial efforts predate any EPA action
under CERCLA, barring judicial review is unwarranted by the words of the statute and
by its underlying policies."). For a general discussion of the retroactivity issue, see Light,
The Importance of "Being Taken", supra note 5, at 36-38.
115. See Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991). The court found
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that a state is entitled to ensure that a cleanup is in-compliance
with state hazardous waste laws authorized by the EPA as a substitute to the Resource Conservation Recovery Act ("RCRA")1 1 6 in

that state.117 These cases have slightly ameliorated some of the
harsh impact of the strict jurisdictional bar.
In particular, the plaintiffs in Durfey v. E.I. DuPontDe Nemours
Co. 1 1 8

fared better than their counterparts in Hanford Downwinders

Coalition and Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency. In Durfey
the plaintiffs alleged a health harm. They claimed that there was a
potential health risk at the federally owned 1 9 Hanford Nuclear
Reservation, a designated Superfund site.120 However, the plaintiffs
that this was not subject to the jurisdictional bar because it was not a challenge to the
administration of CERCLA, but a challenge to the constitutionality of the statutory scheme
itself, particularly its provisions allowing for imposition of a lien without a prior hearing.
See id. at 1517. For further discussion of Reardon, consult Clark, supra note 47; Faulkner,
supra note 43; Note, First Circuit Finds that CERCLA Lien Provision Violates Due
Process, 105 HARV. L. RaV. 1420 (1992); CERCLA Liens Illegal, First Circuit Rules,
Finding Law Lacking in ProceduralSafeguards, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1741
(Nov. 8, 1991); First Circuit Allows Pre-Enforcement Review of EPA Lien Imposed
Following CERCLA Cleanup, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1645 (Jan. 11, 1991). The
lower court opinion in the case is reported at Reardon v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 558
(D. Mass. 1990), and the issues involved are discussed in Landowners Allege Superfund
Lien Illegal, Violates Due Process Clause of Constitution, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 31,
at 1362 (Dec. 1, 1989).
116. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994).
117. See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1578 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[E]nforcement actions under state hazardous waste laws which have been authorized by the EPA to
be enforced by the state in lieu of RCRA do not constitute 'challenges' to CERCLA
response actions; therefore § 9613(h) does not jurisdictionally bar Colorado from enforcing the final amended compliance order.'), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994). This case
raised many complex issues regarding federal/state relations in the area of CERCLA
enforcement. Although the Supreme Court declined to hear the case, it was widely
commented on. See, e.g., Jason H. Eaton, Creating Confusion: The Tenth Circuit's Rocky
Mountain Arsenal Decision, 144 MrL. L. REv. 126 (1994); Reform Bill Would Limit States'
Role at Federal Sites, HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, Feb. 15, 1994, available in Westlaw,
HAZWN File, WL 2516132 (discussing proposed legislative reversal of Colorado case);
U.S. Petitions for Certiorari in Rocky Mountain Arsenal Case, PESTICIDE & Toxic
CHEMICAL NEWS, Dec. 1, 1993, available in Westlaw, PTCHEMN File, WL 2757217;
Vicky L. Peters, Laura E. Perrault & Susan MacKay Smith, Can States Enforce RCRA at
Superfund Sites? The Rocky Mountain Arsenal Decision, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,419 (July 1993).
118. 59 F.3d 121 (9th Cir. 1995).
119. For a full discussion of the § 113(h) questions unique to federal facilities, see
Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Challenges to Federal Facility Cleanups and CERCLA Section
113(h), 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 353 (1995).
120. The Durfey case had previously been consolidated as part of the In re Hanford
Nuclear Reservation Litig., 780 F. Supp. 1551 (E.D. Wash. 1991), rev'd sub nom., Durfey
v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours Co., 59 F.3d 121 (9th Cir. 1995). That court had held, among
other things, that medical monitoring was a "challenge" and, therefore, it constituted a
barred claim under § 113(h) of CERCLA. For a fuller discussion of the lower court
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brought suit for the tort of medical monitoring, rather than for a
specific statutory remedy. Although the lower court found the claim
to be barred on jurisdictional grounds, the Ninth Circuit reversed,
finding that medical monitoring should not be defined as a "response" cost; thus, it was not subject to the section 113(h) bar.' 2'
In addition, Cabot Corp. v. United States EPA122 also addressed
allegations that a response plan might harm the environment. Initially, the court faced a PRP's request seeking an injunction against
a cleanup plan until the EPA "enters into a contract or cooperative
agreement with [Pennsylvania], evaluates each plan, including the
PRP's alternative, for cost-effectiveness and seeks public review
and comment on its determination.' 123 It was alleged that EPA's
failure to take these actions constituted a violation of CERCLA
and the National Contingency Plan ("NCP") that would justify the
injunction sought. 2 4 The government opposed this request for an
injunction on the merits 25 as well as on the grounds that the court
lacked jurisdiction pursuant to section 9613(h).126
Interestingly, and without citation to any direct authority, the
Cabot court stated in dicta that if irreparable harm to health and
the environment were to be alleged, the court could justifiably
review the proposed remedy:
Although PRPs are not in terms barred from bringing citizen
suits, Congress' decision to enable EPA to clean up hazardous
waste sites prior to litigating the allocation of the expenses of
those clean-ups supports a distinction between citizen suits
alleging irreparable harm and those claiming monetary damages. Health and environmental hazards must be addressed as
promptly as possible ....Irreparable harms are precisely those
that one would expect "typical" concerned citizens ... to raise
opinion, see Medical Monitoring Costs Not Recoverable Under Superfund Law, Federal

Court Decides, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1774-75 (Nov. 15, 1991).
121. Durfey, 59 F3d at 126. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on
Price v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 1994), in which the court
also classified medical monitoring as beyond the scope of "response" costs. Durfey, 59
F.3d at 125. The Durfey decision is discussed in Ninth Circuit Finds No JurisdictionalBar

to Court Review of Medical Monitoring Claims, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 553-54
(July 14, 1995).
122. 677 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1988).

123. Id. at 825.
124. Id.

125. Id. at 826 n.3. The EPA argued that it did, in fact, comply with the CERCLA
and NCP requirements when formulating the remedial plan involved.
126. Id. at 825.
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in a lawsuit under CERCLA ....
But where PRPs allege harms
the implications of which are essentially monetary, those allegations should be tested when EPA seeks to collect clean-up
costs .... 127

The Cabot court eventually ruled that it did not have jurisdiction
over the case because the alleged harm was purely monetary and
could be adequately addressed later as part of a cost-recovery
action. 12 Thus, Cabot is not completely inconsistent with the vast
majority of cases, and it placed clear limits on the ability of PRPs
to recast their challenges as health-related citizens suits.129 However, in dicta, the Cabot court made the same arguments that the
Gamma-Tech court later adopted as part of its holding 30 and that
Congress should find compelling as well."'
Three themes should be clear from these cases. First, although
there have been a few relatively narrow exceptions, courts have
been strict in enforcing the jurisdictional bar. Secondly, courts that
do apply the bar strictly often do it with expressed reluctance.
Third, when courts have voiced dissatisfaction with strict application of the bar, they have suggested that legislative action, and not
judicial maneuvering, is the proper mechanism for correcting the
bar. It is into this environment that two significant developments
have occurred: the Gamma-Tech decision, in which a court does
alter the strictness of the bar through judicial action, and Congressional reconsideration of CERCLA, which makes a legislative change
in the jurisdictional bar possible.
IV. UNITED STATES V PRINCETON GAMMA-TECH: A MODEL FOR
132
A LEGISLATIVE EXCEPTION FOR "IRREPARABLE HARM"

While most courts have refused to create exceptions to the
jurisdictional bar, in United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech,
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 829.
Id. at 830.
For a discussion of this aspect of Cabot, see Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 574.
See Cabot, 677 F. Supp. 823 at 829; United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech,

Inc., 31 F.3d 138, 148 (3d Cir. 1994).

131. Further discussion of Cabot may be found in McConnell, supra note 78, at
127.
132. For a thoughtful case note discussing the Gamma-Tech case, see McConnell
supra note 78. The heart of Mr. McConnell's argument suggests that while he supports

the policy justifications for the decision, see id. at 128-30, the case was wrongly decided
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Inc., 33 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
offered a more liberal reading of/the restrictive jurisdictional requirements.134 In what it characterized as a case of first impression, 135 the court held that:
[W]hen the EPA sues to recover initial expenditures incurred
in curing a polluted site, a district court may review a property
owner's bonafide allegations that continuance of the project will
cause irreparable harm to public health or the environment
and,
136
in appropriate circumstances, grant equitable relief.

If followed by other courts or adopted legislatively by Congress,
this rule will make a substantial change in the way the jurisdictional bar functions as a restriction on pre-completion cleanup
review. 137

because (1) it is inconsistent with applicable precedents, see id. at 131-32; (2) it misconstrues the legislative history, see id. at 130-31; and (3) it opens the door to abuse by PRPs,
see id. at 132-33.
133. 31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994).
134. When Gamma-Tech was decided, its novel approach to the jurisdictional bar
attracted the immediate attention of practitioners and the regulated community. See
Appeals Court Finds No JurisdictionalBar to Review of Cleanup Remedy at New Jersey
Site, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 629-30 (Aug. 5, 1994); Injunctive Relief OK'd in
Ongoing Superfund Actions, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 743 (Aug. 19, 1994); Frank
M. Thomas Jr. & Sarah E. Davies, ChallengingSuperfund Remedies: EPA's DecisionsMay
Be Judicially Reviewed and Enjoined Before Project Completion, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 18, at 846 (Sept. 2, 1994); Appeals Court Allows Challenge to Superfund Remedy
Before Completion, PESTICIDE & Toxic CHEMICAL NEWS, Aug. 10, 1994, available in
Westlaw, PTCHEMN File, WL 2523429; Court Rules EPA Remedies May be Challenged
Before Completion, HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, Sept. 12, 1994, available in Westlaw,

HAZWN File, WL 2516245. Indeed, EPA's request for rehearing, and the court's denial,
was also reported. See Superfund Remedy Challenges, PESTICIDE & Toxic CHEMICAL

NEWS, Oct. 19, 1994, available in Westlaw, PTCHEMN File, WL 3219211; Rehearing
Sought in Superfund Remedy Challenge, PESTICIDE & Toxic CHEMICAL NEWS, Sept. 28,
1994, available in Westlaw, PTCHEMN File, WL 2524801; Third Circuit Declines
Rehearing in CERCLA Cases, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1318 (Nov. 4, 1994);
Superfund Remedy Challenge, PESTICIDE & Toxic CHEMICAL NEWS, Nov. 9, 1994,

available in Westlaw, PTCHEMN File, WL 3219349. This attention was caused to a great
extent by the fact that the decision "marks a major change from past decisions." Court
Rules EPA Remedies May be ChallengedBefore Completion, supra. For further discussion
of Gamma-Tech, consult William F. Mahoney, Michelle Dall, Melissa A. Flom, Gayle
Tennison-Croxton & Sharon Boudreaux, Recent Developments in Toxic & Hazardous
Substances & EnvironmentalLaw, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 597, 621-23 (1995) (summarizing
ruling of the case).
135. Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 146.
136. Id. at 140.
137. For a discussion of later courts' treatment of Gamma-Tech, see infra part IV.C.
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A. The Gamma-Tech Cause of Action

The dispute in Gamma-Tech arose when trichloroethylene contamination was found on two New Jersey properties owned by the

defendant, Princeton Gamma-Tech. 13 Following this discovery, the
sites were placed on the National Priorities List ("NPL"), as man-

dated by CERCLA.1 39 EPA began its preliminary studies of the sites
and the required remediation and issued two Records of Decisions
140
outlining its plans for cleaning up the contamination.
In 1991, the EPA sued Gamma-Tech,14 1 seeking reimbursement

for the costs it had already incurred in responding to the contami-

nation, as well as "a declaratory judgement on Gamma-Tech's
liability for future response costs.

142

Notwithstanding the consis-

tent rulings against pre-completion challenges, Gamma-Tech filed
a cross-motion against EPA for a preliminary injunction preventing
the agency from pursuing its chosen cleanup procedure.1 43 GammaTech based this request on its assertion that continued pursuit of
the remedial plan would "exacerbate the existing environmental
damage and cause further irreparable harm to the environment." 144
If factually true, the potential harm from EPA's ordered plan would

have either been difficult or impossible to remedy after the EPA
138. Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 140.
139. Id. The NPL lists the nation's most hazardous waste sites, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 9605 (1994).
140. Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 140-41. The first Record of Decision was issued in
1987, and it outlined the preliminary plan for remediation. Id. The second Record of
Decision was issued the following year. It provided the details about the proposed cleanup
and provided the public and the PRPs with the opportunity to comment on the proposed
plan. Id. at 141. This second Record of Decision:
[P]roposed to extract contaminated water from the primary contamination
plume in the shallow aquifer, to treat it, and then to reinject it into the aquifer.
In addition, the plan provided for the installation of "open-hole" wells that
penetrate through the shallow source to the deep aquifer to allow for monitoring and sampling.
Id.
141. This suit was brought under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
142. Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 141.
143. Id. Specifically, the defendant sought an injunction that would require the EPA
"to cease the installation of open-hole wells ... and to cease construction of the remedial
system provided for in the 1988 decision?' Id.
144. Id. "According to Gamma-Tech, the system devised by the EPA will cause
contaminated water from the shallow strata of the aquifer to be drawn down into the deep
zone where contamination has not been established conclusively, thus increasing, rather
than remedying, the pollution of the water supply?' Id.
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completed its proposed cleanup. 45 This differed significantly from
the typical challenge. The usual challenge to a cleanup order is
more focused-explicitly or not-on the economic ramifications to
the responsible party. Such financial consequences will always be
46
compensable, at least in theory if not in practice.1
Based on the language of the statute and the case law interpreting it,147 the district court concluded that it was barred from

addressing the defendant's request due to the statutory jurisdictional bar. 141The appellate court reversed. It departed from a strict
reading of the jurisdictional bar, making a significant substantive
ruling rejecting its appropriateness in the face of irreparable harm.
Its opinion reflects dissatisfaction with an overly stringent bar that
may well defeat the goals of CERCLA. It is this departure from
the strict rule that makes Gamma-Tech worth examining to determine whether Congress should use it as a model to create a clear
149
exception in CERCLA.

B. The Gamma-Tech Rationale
In its decision, the Gamma-Tech court followed three lines of
reasoning to justify its conclusion that PRPs should enjoy judicial
review of EPA cleanup orders posing irreparable health or environmental threats.1 50 These issues were: CERCLA's legislative history;
145. For a review of the circumstances at the Gamma-Tech site, see McConnell,
supra note 78, at 117-22.
146. In contrast, if a harm poses a truly irreparable harm to health or the environment, its consequences will not be compensable.
147. See supra parts II-nI.
148. See United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 817 F. Supp. 488 (D.N.J. 1993);
see also IrreparableHann Allegations Insufficient to Create Jurisdiction,Federal Court
Rules, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 52, at 3202 (Apr. 23, 1993) (discussing district court
opinion upholding jurisdictional ban).
149. If modelled after Gamma-Tech, such an exception would allow review and
injunctive relief in those cases where no review would likely result in irreparable
environmental harm or a threat to human health and safety. This proposed exception is
developed fully infra part V.B.
150. The court also faced a potential due process claim by Gamma-Tech concerning
the court's refusal to add supplemental materials to the record. Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at
149-50. This argument is beyond the scope of this Article and was not addressed by the
court, although some due process concerns were raised in the legislative history of the
provisions. See H.R. REP. No. 253(111), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1986), reprintedin 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3045.

1996]

Review of CERCLA Cleanup Procedures

the unique procedural posture of the case; and the function of
151
CERCLA's citizens suit provisions.
1. Legislative History in Gamma-Tech
The Gamma-Tech court began its analysis of the problem by

explicating the legislative history of the jurisdictional bar and the
intent of CERCLA itself. Like earlier courts, the Gamma-Tech

court acknowledged the conflict between CERCLA's goal of "combat[ing] the hazards that toxic waste sites pose to public health or
the environment '

52

1

and the competing desire to "safeguard EPA

remedial efforts from delays brought by potentially responsible
parties."1 53 The court discussed the danger of dilatory litigation and
recognized the sound policies justifying the bar.154 However, the
court elected to read the legislative history differently. It focused

on the obvious fact that CERCLA and SARA were created to
remedy environmental harm. In the court's view, using the jurisdictional bar to prevent the court from averting environmental harm

would, in and of itself, violate the statutes' remedial intent as
expressed by Congress.155 Taking into account the potentially conflict-

ing goals of CERCLA, the Third Circuit attempted to strike a
151. For a general discussion of environmental citizens suits, see
AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SuiTs

MICHAEL

D.

(1992).

152. Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 141.
153. Id. The court, in support of this position, cites extensively to the legislative
history of the Superfund Amendments & Reauthorization Act of 1986. See 31 F.3d 138,
141-42 (quoting 132 CONG. REc. 28,409 (1986) (statement of Sen. Stafford) (indicating
a congressional desire to deter "specious suits [that] would slow cleanup and enable private
parties to avoid or at least delay paying their fair share of cleanup costs").
154. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 253(V), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3148 ("The purpose of this provision is to ensure that there will be
no delays associated with a legal challenge of the particular removal or remedial action
Without such a provision, responses to releases or threatened releases of hazardous
....
substances could be unduly delayed, thereby exacerbating the threat of damage to human
health or the environment.").
155. As with so many uses of legislative history, there are statements in the
legislative records that support opposing positions. While the court rightly points to those
sections supporting the bar, there are also plentiful references supporting the more liberal
review policy the court ultimately adopts. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REc. 29,741 (1986)
(statement of Rep. Florio) ("In order to be fully effective in enforcing the law's cleanup
standards provisions, such suits must be brought at a point in the cleanup process where
the agency could easily be ordered to modify its violative behavior.").
Indeed, in the context of CERCLA the use of "post-hoc legislative history" as a way
to resolve the ambiguities of the statute is particularly criticized. See, e.g., Light, The
Importance of "Being Taken", supra note 5, at 45-49.
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balance. In striking that balance, the court determined that the risk
of dilatory litigation was the lesser of two evils when compared to
the prospect of allowing an environmentally harmful "cleanup" to
occur.156

Whether this was the correct balance is an arguable point, and
there certainly are legitimate interests both in avoiding delay and
in averting harm. However, justifying its decision by using the
legislative history as this court did poses a dangerous precedent.
The Gamma-Tech court used logic that may encourage other courts
to depart even farther from the bright line rule of the current statute
in both principled and unprincipled ways.157
2. The ProceduralPosture in Gamma-Tech
The Gamma-Tech court further advanced its opinion because
the case came before it in a unique procedural posture. The challenge to the cleanup plan was not raised by the defendant in an
action it initiated entirely of its own accord. Instead, the government brought the cost-recovery suit before the cleanup had actually
been completed. Procedurally, then, Gamma-Tech's challenge to
the cleanup plan came as a response to the cost-recovery suit. This
order of events provided the court with legal grounds for distinguishing this case from earlier ones and reaching the outcome it
wanted. Specifically, the Gamma-Tech court noted that earlier courts
had established that the proper time for cleanup challenge was
during a cost-recovery suit brought by the government for reim156. As with most litigation of this sort, the court remanded to the district court
the question of whether and how the actual circumstances of this remedy constituted a
potentially irremediable health, safety, or environmental hazard. See Light, The Importance
of "Being Taken", supra note 5, at 48.
157. In addition, it has been suggested that the use of the legislative history by the
Gamma-Tech court was not entirely sound as a matter of construction. McConnell, supra
note 78, at 130-31. Mr. McConnell suggests that "[riather than coming to grips with the
most authoritative legislative history, the majority in Princeton Gamma-Tech relied on
conflicting statements made on the House and Senate floors by individual conferees:' Id.
McConnell concludes that this "further demonstrate[s] the dangers of judicial reliance on
legislative history." Id. at 131. Perhaps this is an argument that can be made anytime
legislative history is asserted by a court to justify an outcome that does not seem to be
clearly required on the face of the statute it purports to apply. However, the court's
decision was particularly dangerous in this situation because adoption of this general
remedial purpose rationale to justify a departure may well justify more widespread
departures in the future.
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bursement of response costs.'5 8 Based on this precedent, there is
little dispute that once a cleanup is completed and EPA brings a
cost-recovery suit, the court hearing that claim also obtains jurisdiction to hear other challenges to the EPA action brought by the
responsible party. 159 However, the effect of this precedent on the

Gamma-Tech situation was less clear, because the EPA had brought
the recovery action before the cleanup was completed. Given this
difference, the court was required to determine whether, in these
circumstances, it was (1) bound to find that jurisdiction over the
cost-recovery suit included jurisdiction over challenges to EPA's
action, or (2) compelled to rule that the interest in delaying challenges to the cleanup was important enough to deprive the court
of jurisdiction, even when the EPA's cost-recovery suit was rightfully before the court.
While acknowledging that there are sound reasons for delaying
challenges until the cleanup work is complete, the court pointed out
that CERCLA did authorize the EPA to bring a cost-recovery suit
before a cleanup was complete.1 60 Furthermore, the statutory language does not differentiate "between the scope of an action where
all the remedial work has been completed and one filed while the
project is still in progress' 1 61 Thus, the litigation was in court at
the government's initiative and in defiance of no explicit statutory
command. Given this, the court felt justified in intervening on
procedural grounds that distinguished this case from its predecessors.

158. Specifically, the court referred to Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st
Cir. 1991); Voluntary Purchasing Groups v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1989); Barmet
Aluminum Corp. v. Reilly, 927 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1991); and Dickerson v. EPA Adm'r,
834 F.2d 974 (lth Cir. 1987). These cases are more fully discussed supra notes 115, 79,
75 and 88. Furthermore, the court relied on United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1446
(10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 300, for the proposition that once a cost-recovery
suit is brought by EPA, the responsible party may challenge EPA's expenditures, the
appropriateness of the remedy selected, and the fundamental question of the "responsible"
party's actual liability. Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 143.

159. Indeed, at present, this is one of the primary means through which the
suitability or even legality of EPA's course of action is determined.
160. Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 143.
161. Id. As the court points out, should the government choose to bring the action

prior to the completion of the cleanup, it may only recover costs "incurred." Id. Thus, this
may provide a disincentive for premature government suits since later litigation will be
required to recover subsequently incurred costs associated with the cleanup.
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The court found the procedural posture of the case helpful in
another regard as well. The court stated that, in its view, while the
government may bring suit for reimbursement of its remedial expenses, the court was authorized to grant reimbursement only for
those expenses which were consistent with the NCP 162 Thus, if the
government's chosen remedy is determined to be harmful and hence
inconsistent with the NCP the court reasoned that it must have the
ability to deny reimbursement to the government. 163 By definition,
in order to make such a finding, the court would have to review
the proposed cleanup action in some substantive way.
Going one step further, the court also pointed out that, it may
"also grant 'such other relief as is consistent with the National
Contingency Plan,"' 64 when reviewing a claim. Because "such other
relief' includes injunctive relief, 65 the court reasoned that it could,
of its own accord, grant an injunction prohibiting the cleanup from
proceeding. 66 Thus, if the court could grant injunctive relief voluntarily, there was no sound reason which would prevent the court
from granting such relief at the request of a moving party. So,
according to Gamma-Tech, "[W]hen irreparable harm to public
health or the environment is threatened, an injunction may be
issued under the citizens' suit exception of subsection 9613(h)(4)
even though the cleanup may not yet be completed .... [D]elay

in preventing such injury is contrary to the objectives of CERCLA."167 The court went on to say, procedurally that:
It follows that if the section 9613(h)(4) exception allows an
injunction to be issued in a separate citizens' suit that is filed
simultaneously in the same court with an answer to a cost-recovery action for which review is available under section
9613(h)(1), there is no logical basis to deny similar relief in the

162. See H.R. REP. No. 253(V), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3149 ("If the court finds that the selection of the response action was
arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with the law, the court is to award
only the response costs or damages or other relief being sought to the extent that this relief
is not inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan.").
163. Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 147.
164. Id.
165. Such injunctive relief is based on the court's reading of Weinberger v. RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 705 (1979); and
Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960).
166. Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 147.
167. Id. at 148.
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cost-recovery litigation when irreparable harm has been estab-

lished.16

3. The CERCLA Citizens Suit Provision

Finally, the Gamma-Tech court also justified its conclusion by
relying on the citizens suit cases which allow review of an allegedly
harmful cleanup order when that challenge is brought through a citizens suit. 169 The court acknowledged that judicial precedents had been
unclear as to when a citizen may bring such an action and acknowledged that "some doubt exists about when such a suit may be entertained." 70 The court further acknowledged precedents limiting the
right of citizens to bring pre-completion challenges. 171 However,
the court observed that those cases did not address the question of
irreparable environmental harm. Because the court did not feel
72
bound by those precedents, it examined exclusively those cases
168. Id. at 148-49.

169. Presumably, the drafters of CERCLA included the citizens suit provision for

many of the same reasons underlying inclusion of a citizens suit provision in any
statute-to provide an additional avenue for enforcement to ensure that the statutory
mandate is carried out. See 132 CONG. REc. 29,741 (1986) (statement of Rep. Florio)
("[P]ast experience has demonstrated that enforcement of such legal requirements by
affected citizens' groups-acting as private attorneys general-is an essential component
in the implementation of any detailed statutory mandate. For this reason, the amendments
establish an independent citizens' suit provision."); H.R. REP. No. 253(11), 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3060 ("In view of the government's
limited and overburdened enforcement authority, citizens suits are essential to assure
compliance with the law.'). At the time the citizens suit provision was written into SARA,
such provisions were already included in eleven existing federal environmental laws. Id.
at 3056.
170. Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 144.
171. Specifically, the court acknowledged the holdings in Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d
1091, 1095 (7th Cir. 1990); Alabama v. United States EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557 (11th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989); and Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't
of Pollution Control & Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 1216-19 (8th Cir. 1993). Gamma-Tech,
31 F.3d at 144. In those cases, the citizen plaintiffs alleged that the cleanup proposed
violated CERCLA regulations. The court also acknowledged Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson,
923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991), in which the plaintiffs alleged that the action planned would
irreparably harm historical artifacts. Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 147. In none of these cases
did the courts allow the action to be heard prior to completion of the cleanup. However,
no citizens alleged irreparable environmental harm would occur as a result of the cleanup.
This distinction was central to the Gamma-Tech court.
172. For example, the court compared Cabot Corp. v. United States EPA, 677 F.
Supp. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1988) with Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v. Reilly, 716 F.
Supp. 828 (D.N.J. 1989). Both cases acknowledge the vagueness of the statutory guidance

on this point. However, the former resolved this ambiguity in favor of earlier cleanup,
while the latter required completion of at least the first stage of the cleanup before a
challenge could be entertained. See Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 145-46 for full discussion.
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and legislative authorities 173 which dealt directly with alleged irreparable harm. Such cases, arguably, provided more leeway for
courts to decide when review was permissible since they addressed
a more compelling reason to depart from the strict reading of the
jurisdictional bar.
Specifically, CERCLA explicitly authorizes citizens suits if
the parties are "alleging that the removal or remedial action taken

under section 9604 of this title or secured under section 9606 of

this title was in violation of any requirement of this chapter.' 1 74
Reasoning that mandating a cleanup that harmed the environment
would constitute such a violation,175 the court accepted without
question that a citizen would be allowed to bring the suit. 176 Build173. Among others, the court found particularly applicable the following two
conflicting statements:
The section [§ 9613(h)(4)] is designed to preclude lawsuits by any person
concerning particular segments of the response action . . . until those segments of the response have been constructed and given the chance to operate
and demonstrate their effectiveness in meeting the requirements of the act.
Completion of all of the work set out in a particular record of decision marks
the first opportunity at which review of that portion of the response action can
occur.

132 CONG. REc. 28,441 (1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond), quoted in Gamma-Tech, 31
F.3d at 145, and:
It is crucial ... to maintain citizens' rights to challenge response actions, or
final cleanup plans, before such plans are implemented even in part because
otherwise the response could proceed in violation of the law and waste
millions of dollars of Superfund money before a court has considered the
illegality . . . . [C]itizens asserting a true public health or environmental
interest in the response cannot obtain adequate relief if an inadequate clean-up
is allowed to proceed.
132 CONG. REc. 28,409 (1986) (statement of Sen. Stafford), quoted in Gamma-Tech, 31
.3d at 145.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (h)(4) (1994).
175. This violation would occur because, presumably, a "cleanup" that was harmful
would violate the NCP, to which actions must conform. See Gamma-Tech, 31 .3d at 147
("If the response the EPA has selected is determined to be arbitrary and capricious, or
'otherwise not in accordance with law,' the court is only permitted to award the response
costs that are consistent with the National Contingency Plan:').
176. In spite of the importance attached here to the right of citizens to bring
enforcement actions under CERCLA, see Gaba & Kelly, supra note 31. In that piece, the
authors argue that the citizens suit provision in CERCLA is a weak one that does not carry
with it the full range of powers that such provisions have in other environmental statutes:
Although the language of section 310 is similar to the language in citizen suit
provisions of other federal environmental statutes, its effect is not. While
citizen suit provisions under other statutes have given citizens important tools
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ing on this, the court stated without much additional comment that,
"[e]ven though it is a potentially responsible party, Gamma-Tech could

qualify as a plaintiff in a citizens' suit alleging irreparable harm to the
environment?" 177 Hence, "as a defendant in the EPA's cost-recovery

suit, [Gamma-Tech] [was] permitted to allege matters that would
17
normally be considered by the court in a separate citizens suit'

The court's statement on this point may be fair, in that the
rationale behind the citizens suit and the Gamma-Tech challenge is
theoretically identical: preventing an allegedly harmful cleanup
from taking place. 179 However, this conclusion-albeit logicaldoes not acknowledge significant distinctions between third party

citizens and PRPs. While the "citizens suit" provision may technically allow suits by either third party citizens or PRPs, there are
significant differences between these two types of plaintiffs and
their likely motives.8 0 The danger that a potentially responsible
party will use a citizens suit as a dilatory tactic appears to be
greater than the danger of an unrelated' citizen doing So. l8 2 While
to challenge private and government actions, section 310 may have only a
limited role in implementing the environmental objectives of CERCLA. The
citizen suit provision of CERCLA may prove to be a sheep in wolf's clothing.
Id. at 931. The authors go on to identify the jurisdictional bar as a primary reason for this
limited role of the citizens suit.
177. Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 148.
178. Id.
179. Although the scientific underpinnings of the creation of a remedy are beyond
the scope of this Article, what should not be forgotten or underestimated is the significant
health risk of CERCLA sites. See Siegel, supra note 9, at 10,017 ("ATSDR estimates that
abQut 80 percent of all NPL sites have a pathway of potential human exposure to hazardous
substances and that 10 percent of all NPL sites present a pathway of potential exposure
of sufficient concern to warrant further health study." (footnote omitted)).
180. Indeed, SARA's drafters were particularly wary of attempts to recast actions
by responsible parties as citizens suits:
When the essence of a lawsuit involves contesting the liability of the plaintiff
for cleanup costs, the court should apply the other provisions of § 113(h),
which require such plaintiff to wait until the Government has filed a suit under
sections 106 or 107 to seek review of the liability issue. The courts should
not be misled by any effort to present such cases as legitimate "citizens' suits"
challenging illegal action by the agency.
132 CONG. REC. 29,754 (1986) (statement of Rep. Roe) (emphasis added).
181. "Unrelated" need not imply that the citizen have no interest in the resolution
of the dispute. However, unlike the PRPs, they will not be named as a party in the EPA
action, but will, instead enter the dispute voluntarily.
182. See McConnell, supra note 78, at 115 for a cynical view of the PRPs motives
and morals:
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third party citizens, as well as PRPs, may have impure or mixed
motives, any benefit a third party would stand to gain would likely
be more indirect, and the rationale for keeping such claims out of
court seems to be far less compelling. However, this is a significant
policy issue glossed over by the court183 as it emphasized the similarities between, but not the differences
among, challenges brought
1 4
by these very diverse groups.

1

C. The JudicialImpact of Princeton Gamma-Tech

The true impact of the Gamma-Tech decision in CERCLA
jurisprudence has yet to be determined. It is consistent with the
Third Circuit's ruling in United States v. American Color & Chemical, Corp.,' 5 a decision that reversed the lower courts' dismissal
of a challenge on jurisdictional grounds. 8 6 In addition, in Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Browner, 87 the Seventh Circuit cited

Gamma-Tech for the principle that "[tihe defendant would have an
opportunity [in a cost recovery] suit to put the EPA to its proof
that the Superfund law really did require the defendant to clean up
the site."188
Attention all PRP's! Now all you have to do in the Third Circuit to get
preenforcement review is allege "irreparable harm" to the environment. If you
establish irreparable harm to the environment you may be entitled to injunctive
relief. Even if you don't, you can tie the EPA up in prolonged litigation. Heck
its worth a shot; and it's all in the name of saving the environment!
Id.
183. Indeed, the court briefly acknowledged that the EPA is concerned with "potential for interference with future work at a polluted site." Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 149.
However, this concern was dismissed quickly as the court pointed out that "that possibility
exists in every case in which the agency brings its cost-recovery action before conclusion
of the work to be performed at the site." Id.
184. This was acknowledged by the drafters of the statute. See, e.g., 132 CONG.
Rc. 28,409 (1986) (statement of Sen. Stafford) (emphasizing "distinctions between
dilatory or other unauthorized lawsuits by potentially responsible parties involving only
monetary damages and legitimate citizens' suits complaining of irreparable injury"). Of
course, the problem has been that while Congress did recognize this difference, it did not
do anything in the statute itself to require that the two types of plaintiffs be treated
differently.
185. 37 F3d 1489 (3d Cir. 1994), rev'g 832 F. Supp. 106 (M.D. Pa. 1993).
186. For discussions of American Color & Chemical, consult Court Rules EPA
Remedies May be Challenged Before Completion, supra note 134; and Thomas & Davies,
supra note 134.
187. 52 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 699 (1996).
188. Browner, 52 F.3d at 661. However, the court went no further and held that the
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In the district courts, the Eastern District Court of Pennsylva-

nia, in Ehrlich v. Reno, 189 acknowledged that Gamma-Tech created

"two notable exceptions to the requirement that a cleanup must be
completed before it may be challenged."' 9 0 However, because the

two exceptions-EPA's initiation of the cost recovery action and
irreparable harm-were not applicable in Ehrlich, the court was
not forced to follow the Gamma-Tech holding.
It has been suggested that the Gamma-Tech decision will have
a significant judicial impact and have "broader implications on
PRP's who are constantly on the lookout for ways to challenge the
EPA." 191 This argument may be correct if the impact of GammaTech on the courts and on the strategies of PRPs becomes significant. However, a more important and more positive impact of
this decision is that it furnishes an excellent model for legislative
reform.
V. TOWARD A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO THE JUDICIAL REVIEW
QUESTION

192

The Gamma-Tech court's liberal reading of the jurisdictional
bar protected the environment from a potentially harmful
defendant "could not challenge the order in advance of having to comply; that route is...
closed?' Id.
189. No. CIV.A.93-5829, 1994 WL 613698 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 68 E3d 456
(3d Cir. 1995). This decision, however, focused more on the liability issue rather than the
nature of the cleanup.
190. Ehrlich, 1994 WL 613698, at *4.
191. See McConnell, supra note 78, at 132. Mr. McConnell cites five largely
negative impacts of the Gamma-Tech decision:
(1) "Undoubtedly, PRPs will seize upon this new opportunity to tangle the EPA in
litigation." Id.
(2) "[W]ith a new method by which to challenge the EPA there is a likelihood, if
not a certainty, that there will be an increase in the number of challenges to EPA actions
prior to their completion." Id.
(3) "[T]hese new 'irreparable harm' challenges will require factual findings to
determine whether the EPA's chosen plan of clean-up will indeed exacerbate rather than
remedy the problem?' Id.
(4) "PRPs will have increased bargaining power as they negotiate with the EPA."
Id. at 133.
(5) "[Ihe granting of pre-enforcement review negates the purpose of the timing of
review provision?' Id.
192. The fact that this problem must be resolved by the legislature has often been
remarked on by the courts. Although in a different context, the court in Boarhead Corp.
v. Erickson made the case quite clearly that even if failing to provide judicial relief will
result in irreparable harm, the courts are bound not to give themselves jurisdiction when
Congress has not done so. Boarhead, 923 E2d at 1021. The court reluctantly concluded:
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cleanup. 193 In that sense, it was a "good" decision. However, this
resolution of the case is not directly supportable by the text of the
statute 94 or by the most analogous precedents1 95 Furthermore, if
the rule the court created is read too broadly, it has the potential
to become much more widely employed than the Gamma-Tech court
intended. 96 At the same time, because the decision is so closely
In Boarhead's situation post clean-up review is likely to be inadequate to
redress harm that occurred to archeological and historical resources on Boarhead Farm during the EPA's clean-up. Nevertheless, the statute's plain language eliminates Boarhead's opportunity to obtain judicial review even in such
circumstances . ... Although post-study judicial review cannot rectify damage to historical artifacts or remains on this landmark site that occurs in the
course of the EPA's clean-up, we must presume Congress balanced the
problem of irreparable harm to such interests and concluded that the interest
in removing the hazard of toxic waste from Superfund sites outweighed it.
Boarhead's remedy lies with Congress, not the district court.
Id. at 1022-23. Although Boarhead involved irreparable harm to historical artifacts rather
than to health, the point raised seems directly applicable: no matter how compelling the
interest or irrevocable the harm, the solution to the mischief caused by the bar is best
created by Congress, rather than by a court.
193. On remand, Gamma-Tech would have to demonstrate that the allegedly harmful
remedy was indeed arbitrary and capricious. United States v. Prihceton Gamma-Tech, Inc.,
31 F.3d 138, 149 (3d Cir. 1994).
194. In Stearns, supra note 74, the author suggests an interesting alternative to a
legislative reform of CERCLA. He argues that if citizens suits are allowed to be brought
under RCRA to challenge CERCLA cleanups, then irreparable harm as a result of
CERCLA cleanups will be prevented "[b]ecause RCRA compels handlers of hazardous
wastes to manage their wastes in a way that eliminates risk of future harm to public health
and the environment." Id. at 52.
The author develops his argument persuasively by showing the close ties between
RCRA & CERCLA., id., passim, and theorizing that allowing challenges under RCRA
will not undermine CERCLA's focus on undelayed remediation. Id. As the author points
out, courts-particularly the Eighth and Tenth Circuits-are split as to whether the
CERCLA bar also prevents RCRA challenges. Id. at 73-78. Assuming that more courts
adopt the view that RCRA challenges are compatible with the CERCLA scheme, the
author's theory has merit as an indirect solution to the problem caused by the inflexibility
of the jurisdictional bar.
However, a direct solution that addresses the problem at its source is preferable. The
source of the problem is CERCLA's failure to consider situations in which a health and
safety exception is needed. Building in such an exception to the statute rather than
requiring courts to extrapolate a RCRA solution is the most efficient way to solve the
problem. In the interim, though, the RCRA solution is well worth greater consideration.
Unfortunately, a full critique of the RCRA analysis is beyond the scope of this Article.
195. In petitioning for a rehearing of the decision, EPA argued that allowing
jurisdiction in this case "'creates a direct split with the well-reasoned decisions of every
other court of appeals that has decided the issue."' Rehearing Sought in Superfund Remedy
Challenge, supra note 134.
196. Indeed, fear that broad reading of the ruling would "unleash a torrent of
litigation against the United States, which will seriously undermine EPA's ability to
remediate hazardous sites effectively and promptly" underlaid the EPA's argument for a
rehearing. Id. The EPA also emphasized the diversion of limited funds from response
actions to defense of suits, the disincentive it provides for EPA cost recovery suits, and
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tailored to the procedural posture and factual specifics of this particular case, the ruling is potentially limited in scope and may
therefore shrink into oblivion as an anomaly of CERCLA jurisprudence. The ruling seems crafted to apply in such a small, subjectively determined group of cases that it almost does not seem worth
creating an exception to the rule at all. Thus, ironically, the GammaTech court's expansive rule is both overly narrow and dangerously

broad.
Despite its limitations as a common law precedent, the great

contribution of the Gamma-Tech decision is its treatment of a specific
and serious flaw in the current CERCLA regime. It is also noteworthy for suggesting limited circumstances that may justify an
exception. Coming at a time when Congress is considering reauthorization of CERCLA amidst general dissatisfaction with the CER-

CLA scheme, 197 the Gamma-Tech decision can provide some guidance in creating a refined jurisdictional rule.

the administrative difficulties district courts would face if forced to engage in extensive
pre-completion review. Id.
197. The notion that CERCLA is "broken" has been widely reported among the
public, politicians at all points of the political spectrum, and the EPA itself. See, e.g., Don
Ritter, Progress is Possible-With a Vision, ENVTL. F., Jan./Feb. 1996 at 44 ("Superfund
reform may still have the greatest prospects in the 104th because there has been a lot of
sensible dialog on it and everybody knows it's broken."); Slants & Trends, HAZARDOUS
WASTE NEWS, Feb. 5, 1996, available in Westlaw, HAZWN File, WL 7981644 ("'Superfund is a poster child for regulatory reform' . . . "')(quoting Rep. David McIntosh
(R-Ind.)); Brown & Sucaet, supra note 4, at 387 ("A decade of CERCLA litigation...
has resulted in great sums of resources being spent in litigation, rather than successfully
cleaning up pollution."); Madsen, Arfmann & Galbavy, supra note 10, at 1020 ("As the
time for reauthorization of Superfund approaches, the call for change is intensifying ....
This is not surprising given the groundswell of criticism aimed at the superfund due to its
unwieldy transaction costs, cost to the U.S. economy and the minimal remediation benefits
to the environment"); Jennifer Silverman, Superfund Seeks Permanence in Unstable
Congress, 1996 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 22 (Feb. 2, 1996) [hereinafter Silverman,
Superfund Seeks Permanence) ("A consensus has emerged that superfund needs to be
fixed:'). But see Statement of Lois J. Schiffer Assistant Attorney General, Environment
and Natural Resources Division, Department of Justice, Before the Subcommittee on Water
Resources and Environment, Transportationand Infrastructure Committee, United States
House of Representatives, Concerning Superfund Reauthorization, June 27, 1995 [hereinafter Schiffer I] ("The Superfund enforcement program is now working very well to get
the responsible parties to clean up hazardous waste sites. The strict, retroactive, and joint
and several liability scheme is fundamental to maintaining this effectiveness. We recognize
that there are problems, but those problems all have targeted solutions.').
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A. Creating a Health and Environmental Harm Exception: A
Modest Proposal

Rather than retain the strict jurisdictional bar that allows potentially harmful cleanups to continue, 198 or adopt an arbitrary court-

created remedy for a serious statutory flaw, Congress should reconsider the issue of the jurisdictional bar in the text of the statute
itself. While concern about dilatory litigation is a legitimate reason
not to abandon the bar,1 99 concern about potential health or environmental harms is a reason to create a very narrow sixth 200 exception in the statute.2 0 1 This exception should allow a remedial order
to be challenged through a citizens suit under a set of guidelines
that will allow courts to block an unhealthy or environmentally
harmful remedial plan from progressing.
Obviously, the best way to avoid a judicial challenge to a
dangerous plan is to prevent that plan from ever being implemented
in the first place. To that end, the first step should be a careful
refinement of the public comment provisions in CERCLA that
20 2
speak to the ways in which remedial plans are initially created.
198. The danger of the strict ban is also expressed in McConnell, supra note 78, at
128:
There are strong policy reasons for interpreting the citizens' suit provision so
as to permit judicial review prior to completion of a clean-up phase, where
there are bona-fide allegations of "irreparable harm" to the environment or the
public health. Delay in preventing such injuries is contrary to the objectives
of CERCLA and results in the nullification of the right to the remedy
envisioned by the citizens' suit provision.
Id.
199. See Oxley, supranote 10, at B4 ("The average federal Superfund cleanup costs
an astronomical $30 million. Because of the expense, companies choose to litigate rather
than clean up. This begins the food chain of litigation where big polluters seek to gobble
up small ones, resulting in no cleanup and years of stagnation."). Although this comment
was addressed to the problem of CERCLA litigation generally, it is apropos to any
discussion of jurisdiction.
200. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text for a listing of the five existing
exceptions.
201. Creating this exception necessarily involves the very delicate balancing act
described by Gaba & Kelly, supra note 31, at 952 ("[T]he challenge of interpreting the
role of pre-implementation citizen challenges to EPA cleanup plans lies in resolving the
conflicting objectives of ensuring proper cleanup plans by the government while not
unduly delaying the cleanup of hazardous waste sites.").
202. Currently, CERCLA provisions for public participation may be found in 42
U.S.C. § 9613(k) (1994) (allowing for public participation in creation of administrative
record on which selection of remedy and judicial review of remedy will be based); 42
U.S.C. § 9617(a),(b),(c) (1994) (providing for publication of and public participation in
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It is preferably at this stage-rather than at the litigation stagethat the community and the PRPs have the opportunity to air concerns about potential irremediable harm to health and the environment. At this stage all members of the affected community should
be given as extensive an opportunity as is feasible to contribute
their evidence of medical or ecological concern. Thus, ideally, the
plans that are put into effect will only be ordered after all genuine
concerns have been addressed satisfactorily.2 3 Resolving these questions earlier rather than later will ensure that they are addressed
before harm actually happens; identified so that costly mistakes are
not made in plan development; and resolved in a forum that is
hopefully less expensive, divisive and protracted than formal litigation.
However, even if these steps are taken, there will, unfortunately, be times when a questionable plan is ordered and judicial
review is needed. Thus, the question becomes how to allow for
review of those plans without inviting the dilatory litigation that
was so feared by the drafters of the jurisdictional bar.
Underlying this proposal is the basic notion that the question
of liability should, for purposes of creating this sixth exception, be
204
divorced from the question of the appropriateness of the remedy.
developing proposed and final remedial action plans); and 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(2) (1994)
(describing public participation in proposed settlement agreements). For a fuller discussion
of participation issues, consult William J. Friedman, JudicialReview Under the Superfund
Amendments: Will PartiesHave Meaningful Input to the Remedy Selection Process?, 14
COLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 187 (1989).
203. Of course, this stage will be complicated by the fact that there will often be
other issues besides health and safety that are "on the table" at this point-issues such as
cost-effectiveness, quality of the cleanup, the level to which the site will be remediated,
etc. These issues, as well as local political and economic issues, can easily dominate the
preliminary decision making process. However, studying health and environmental safety
should be made an explicit priority in the information gathering/plan development stage,
and they should take precedence over other concerns when participation from the public
is sought.
204. This view is not universally held. See Madsen, Arfmann, & Galbavy, supra
note 10, at 1023-24. Madsen and his colleagues argue that a debate over liability should
be a factor in pre-enforcement review:
[W]here a PRP can in good faith assert it is not liable, it should be afforded
the opportunity for a declaration of non-liability before incurring substantial
cleanup and transaction costs ....

The statute should be amended to clearly

provide for pre-enforcement review when liability is at issue and should
specify the test or tests to be employed.
Id. at 1023. However, liability is a distinct issue from the nature of the remedy, and it
should be kept separate in the proceedings.
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PRPs are entitled to, and should receive, all the benefits of proving
that they are not or should not be responsible for the cleanup
because they were not liable for the dumping. 2 5 To the extent that
they are wrongly held responsible, they should be entitled to appeal
the decision and be reimbursed for the costs they have already
incurred. There can always be the option of financial reimbursement to make a defendant whole after a wrongful determination of
liability.20 6 Hence, PRPs contesting their underlying liability should
do that explicitly and openly in a judicial hearing on liability-and
not disguise it as a pre-enforcement review challenge to the merits

of the remedy selected.
While it may seem artificial to separate the question of "who
must pay for the cleanup?" from "what kind of clean up must they
pay for?," the distinction is principled and the liability issue must
remain separated from this sixth exception. It is consistent with the
"clean up first, litigate later" theory behind CERCLA since it will
allow the cleanup to continue safely while liability is still incompletely resolved.
Once the question of liability is divorced from the question of
the environmental merits of the cleanup plan, it is then possible to
create an exception that retains the jurisdictional bar, but allows
for review where there are legitimate health and safety concerns
about implementing the plan. 20 7 Specifically, this sixth exception
205. A discussion of liability determination is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, the method of allocating responsibility/liability and the strict, retroactive, joint
and several liability scheme that currently underlies CERCLA is the subject of much
debate in current legislative reform of CERCLA. See discussion in and accompanying infra
notes 221-222.
206. Once the cleanup is complete and the government brings an enforcement
action, under the scheme currently in place, the PRP will have another opportunity to
address any grievances about the plan. In addition, if the PRP is convinced that the plan
poses a health or environmental threat but was not able to meet the heavy burden of proof
under this new exception, he could still raise it in a later enforcement proceeding. For
example, the PRP may claim that he should not have to pay for the cleanup because it
violated the NCP by harming rather than helping the environment. Or, he may want to get
a declaratory judgement against the government holding it liable for any potential claims
made by third parties against the PRP for the harm resulting from the facility cleanup.
While the details of these defenses will vary a great deal depending on the cases and the
scientific merits of the health claims, the fundamental issue is that the PRP will have a
later opportunity to address these harms. Thus, this economic harm is not irremediable.
See also discussion supra note 44.
207. The urgency of protecting human health and the environment is exacerbated
by the fact that "one-quarter of Americans ... live within four miles of a Superfund site."
Budget Impasse Will Halt Cleanups of Toxic Waste, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 30, 1995, at A6
(quoting EPA Administrator Carol Browner).
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adopts a balanced approach that has its roots in the Gamma-Tech

analysis. This balance requires (1) strict requirements as to the
nature of the harm that must be alleged; (2) limitations on joinder

of non-ecological claims to the cleanup challenge; and (3) allocation of costs to the losing party.

First, the exception may only be exercised by plaintiffs who
can allege in good faith that the nature of the cleanup plan in place
will, if continued as ordered, create an (1) irremediable; 2 8 (2) serious; 20 9 (3) non-speculative 210 threat to either human health and
safety or to the natural environment. The plaintiff must bear the

burden of proof on the existence of this level of harm, and the court
should give great deference to the views of EPA.211 Such a rule will
not allow for claims that are based on the cost-effectiveness of the

208. It is necessary that the plan be proven to cause harm that cannot be remedied
by action taken after the cleanup plan is completed. This is an essential element of the
test since it will ensure that the cleanup is not delayed if corrective action may be taken
after the cleanup. This harkens back to the "clean up first, litigate later" philosophy that
should still govern work undertaken pursuant to CERCLA. If a harm can be easily
remedied later on, even at a higher cost, the interest in cleaning the site promptly
outweighs the interest in saving those later correction costs. Most often, to prove that a
harm is irremediable will require a showing that the plan could lead to the death of or
physical harm to humans or wildlife. However, a harm may be found to be irremediable
if it results in contamination of land, water, or air that will, in the long run, pose such
dangers. At some point, a court may find itself facing a situation in which a harm
technically may be remedied later, but at a cost that is so astronomical that it becomes a
wasteful financial impracticality. These "scientifically feasible/fiscally impractical" cases
will pose the biggest challenge for judges. At no time should mere high cost equal
irremediability. Concededly, however, at some point, if the cost reaches out of a feasible
range, a judge may be justified in ruling that the harm is irremediable. However, this
should happen in very rare cases only.
209. Determining "seriousness" will undoubtedly create some difficult questions for
the courts. It may also put them in the unenviable position of having to decide whether
there is ever a harm to human health that can be deemed to be anything but serious.
However, because almost every cleanup will have some effect on the environment, such a
provision is a necessary part of the rule to serve as an effective check on litigation over
plans with de minimis impacts.
210. As with "seriousness," the requirement that the alleged harm be "non-speculative" is, unfortunately, non-self explanatory. Obviously, these two must co-exist to ensure
that the exception does not allow for frivolous claims. Determining what is "non-speculative" is not an easy task, but it is one that courts have been asked to do before, albeit in
different contexts.
211. The rationale for this is logical. When judging EPA's decision to order a
specific clean up plan, "a reviewing court should give deference to the scientific expertise
of the agency. This is not a circumstance where a court is called upon simply to acquiesce
in a determination of law; rather, this is a situation where an administrative agency does
possess expert knowledge in a factual and scientific field." United States v. Princeton
Gamma-Tech, Inc., 31 F.3d 138, 149 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). Interestingly, in
Gamma-Tech, the court, of course, declined to give deference to the EPA. Nevertheless, it
recognized the general presumption that favors doing so.
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plan or the technical details of its execution. Rather, the only
challenges that may be made to the plan under this exception are
those based on an allegation of an irremediable, serious, and nonspeculative threat to human health and safety or the natural envi-

ronment. This first part of the rule clearly builds on the health
exception created by the Gamma-Tech court, but provides more
21 2
concrete and limiting guidance.

This first requirement would narrow the type of claims, establishing that the exception is appropriate only in a specific set of
circumstances. Secondly, however, the scope of potential plaintiffs
must be scrutinized to help eliminate any potential PRP "citizen
plaintiffs" who might seek to use this exception as a disguise for
claims with less pure motives. 21 3 In theory, this might be accomplished by requiring that any challenge brought under this excep-

tion may be brought only by a third party citizen plaintiff rather
than by someone who is also a PRP for the site in question. 21 4 This
restriction has initial appeal. It would provide a layer of protection
against initiation of suits thinly disguised as "health threat" claims
brought by those with a financial interest in delaying the litiga21 5
tion.
212. The only restrictions the Gamma-Tech court placed on judicial review -were
that the alleged responsible party "has the burden to establish that the EPA's choice of
remedy was indeed arbitrary and capricious or otherwise contrary to law." Id.
213. These would, of course, be the dilatory motives that were the basis for the bar.
This cynicism as to the motive of a PRP challenging the adequacy of a remedial plan is
noted in Gaba & Kelly, supranote 31, at 946. In what is, perhaps, an understatement, the
authors comment, "In virtually all cases, PRP's are concerned not with the environmental
adequacy of a clean-up, but with the cost of cleanup that they will be required to bear."
Id.
214. See id. at 952-53. In a more general discussion not pertaining directly to a
health-based exception, these authors argue:
[D]istinctions between citizen suits by responsible parties and other parties
are warranted. PRPs can satisfy their concerns with being held responsible for
unnecessary costs of cleanups through post-cleanup challenges. Citizens challenges to the environmental adequacy of cleanups cannot effectively be
satisfied by post-cleanup litigation.
Id. But see Cabot Corp. v. United States EPA, 677 F. Supp. 823, 829 (E.D. Pa. 1988) ("The
statutory language empowers any person to bring a citizen suit, irrespective of whether
that person is also a PRP... "').
215. See also Gaba & Kelly, supra note 31, at 946-47:
Although limitation of pre-implementation review of cleanup plans by responsible parties serves to satisfy both the objectives of CERCLA and the PRPs,
the same is not true of limiting pre-implementation review by citizens concerned with the environmental adequacy of the cleanup plans. PRPs can
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Unfortunately, of course, this is a restriction that may be both
overinclusive and underinclusive. It may allow bad faith lawsuits
brought by alleged third party citizens who are, in fact, financed
or used by the PRPs. 216 Yet, at the same time, it will not allow an
action brought by a PRP acting in good faith on a legitimate health
concern. This is particularly dangerous in those circumstances where
there is no third party plaintiff other than the PRP who has the
resources for or interest in bringing the suit. Thus, it is a necessary
evil to allow this exception to be used by PRPs as well as third
party plaintiffs. However, the danger should be abated by a strict
limitation on the claims that can be raised under the exception. The
statute must be clear that only the health and ecological questions
may be raised, and no other claims may be joined. This should
reduce the incentives of PRPs to use this provision to "piggyback"
claims with a dilatory intent. Of course, this raises the possibility
of duplicative litigation since it will not allow related issues to be
addressed in one lawsuit. However, this is a less serious problem
than the alternative.
The third aspect of this proposed exception would require
litigation costs and attorneys fees to be paid by the losing party to
a challenge brought under this exception to the bar. Thus, the
government must bear the cost if a challenger succeeds in proving
that the cleanup plan poses an unacceptable health or ecological
risk. This should provide the impetus for the bringing of legitimate
citizens suits, since those who bear the burden of litigating a meri217
torious case will be compensated for their efforts if they succeed.
It may also provide some added incentive for the government to
consider the health aspects of its remedies since the failure to do
so may become costly. Alternatively, those citizens or PRPs who
are considering a frivolous or bad faith lawsuit should be deterred
from doing so because of the possibility of hefty litigation costs.
This third prong, then, provides another way of ensuring that while
always have their monetary liability reduced if the government plan is in error.
Judicial review of the environmental adequacy of a plan after it has been
completed, however, is of limited significance.

Id.
216. Although no specific examples of this have been found to date, creating such

an exception may well create this temptation.
217. This may be particularly important to the extent that citizens suits may often
be brought by non-profit public interest groups with limited resources.
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meritorious concerns do not go unaddressed, frivolous complaints
are deterred.

The net result of an action brought under this new exception
should be a ruling that grants injunctive relief to the successful
plaintiff. Typically, this relief will take the form of an order prohibiting the cleanup-or its dangerous aspects-from taking place.
It should also include an order directing reformulation of the plan
so that cleanup may safely and expeditiously continue.
With such a narrow exception as this proposal creates, the
goals of the original jurisdictional bar will be maintained. However, the major drawback to that bar will be ameliorated. No longer
will the bar block relief from dangerous remedies.

B. CongressionalEfforts at Reforming the JurisdictionalBar
The 104th Congress has been and is now considering bills
which, if passed, would change many aspects of the CERCLA

scheme. 218 This legislative reform effort provides an opportunity for

the rewriting of the jurisdictional bar. This would, ideally, include
a revision to the jurisdictional bar like the one this Article proposes.
The impetus behind these CERCLA reform bills has been

general dissatisfaction with the current Superfund scheme219 as well
as the practical reality that funding authorization for the Superfund
expired on December 31, 1995. Although CERCLA reform bills
had been considered and abandoned by the 103rd Congress in
1994,220 these two factors have given the reform effort a new immediacy that it lacked in 1994.
218. The major House bill on CERCLA reform is H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995), originally introduced on October 18, 1995. Its principal sponsor is Representative
Michael G. Oxley (R-Ohio). The bill is under the jurisdiction, primarily, of the House
Committee on Commerce, as well as the Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure
and the Committee on Ways & Means. In the Senate, the primary initiative on CERCLA
reform is S. 1285, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), originally introduced by Senator Robert
C. Smith (R-N.H.) on September 29, 1995. It was referred to the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works. As this Article went to press in mid-April, the bills were
winding their ways through the House and Senate committees, but Congress had taken no
final action on either of the bills. This Article has, thus, been unable to address any changes
in the bills made after that point.
219. This dissatisfaction is discussed supra note 197.
220. See EnvironmentalLaws FaceRevisions, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., June 17, 1995,
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The process of Superfund reform involves resolution of a number of issues more controversial, well-publicized, and polarizing

than the narrow question of the jurisdictional bar. These issues
include retroactive liability; 221 alterations of the "joint and several

liability" scheme; 2 2 liability exemptions for some small pollutat 1688, 1701 ("Despite winning bipartisan approval from five committees and the support
of the Clinton administration, a bill to revamp Superfund died in the final weeks of the
103rd Congress, the victim of disagreements over proposed taxes, new cleanup standards
and wages paid to federal contractors!').
The fact that there had been an attempt at Superfund reform in the 103rd Congress
has not made the current reform process easier. In fact, it has, perhaps, exacerbated
partisan tensions. See L. Carol Ritchie, Liability Controversy Slows Reform of Superfund
Program, Cong. Green Sheets, Jan. 29, 1996, at 11 ("[R]anking committee Democrat John
D. Dingell (Mich.) and others complain that Republicans-along with a broad coalition
of environmentalists and industry leaders-had already agreed to a more moderate superfund
overhaul in 1994. They question whether that bill-which never reached the floor-was
acceptable then but not now."). However, in the opinion of some, these bills should be
considered as part of the foundation for the current discussions. See Schiffer I, supra note
197 ("Last year, there was broad consensus among a wide variety of parties affected by
Superfund on the solutions to the problems of Superfund. Committees of both houses of
Congress passed similar versions of the Superfund reform bill, with bipartisan votes. I
urge you to look at these bills again, as you search in this new Congress for solutions to
the problems of Superfund").
221. The issue of retroactive liability is, unquestionably, the most controversial of
the issues being debated in the Superfund reform process. It is also the single issue most
likely to make compromise difficult to achieve. See Ritchie, supra note 220, at 10 ("The
controversial issue of retroactive liability for hazardous waste clean-up costs is holding up
progress in the House on a bill overhauling the superfund program."); Silverman, Superfund Seeks Permanence,supra note 197 ("[T]he title governing retroactive liability repeal
under H.R. 2500 remains the biggest barrier to Superfund reform... ").A number of
proposals have been made that would change the scheme of retroactive liability. One would
be close to a full repeal of retroactive liability for all except those who own the land on
which hazardous wastes are dumped. Another would retain retroactive liability but provide
a rebate of nearly 50% to those PRPs who are remediating harm caused long ago. Other
proposals concern the date at which liability would be deemed to be "retroactive:' Two
of the more popularly mentioned dates are 1980 and 1987. The EPA, meanwhile, opposes
the end of retroactive liability because, among other things, a reduction in retroactive
liability will necessitate that more sites be cleaned with limited public funds rather than
the private monies of the PRPs. See Superfund Revision: Statement of Lois J. Schiffer
Assistant Attorney General, Environment & NaturalResources Division, U.S. Department
of Justice, Before the Subcommittee on Water Resources & Environment, Committee on
Transportation & Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, Concerning Superfund,
Nov. 2, 1995 [hereinafter Schiffer II] (arguing that 50% rebate for cleaning up retroactively
"would cost [the EPA] more than $1 billion in excess of its current annual Superfund
budget ...[and] will require the creation of a whole new bureaucracy to process claims,
and lead to considerable litigation."). In contrast, proponents of the repeal argue that the
elimination of the "retroactive PRPs" from the liability scheme will reduce the amount of
litigation, and that these savings will help offset any of the increased cleanup costs. For
a discussion of these various issues related to the repeal of retroactive liability, see
Timothy Noah, House Plan Would Cut Firms' Cleanup Liability, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13,
1996, at A2.
222. Proportional liability, in some form, has been suggested by some advocates.
See Ritchie, supra note 220, at 11 (discussing proportional liability generally).
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ers; 223

Brownfields redevelopment initiatives; 224 administrative reforms to reduce Superfund transaction and litigation costs; 225 insurance liability debates; 22 6 caps on sites added to the NPL; 227 limits
on the amount of wildlife restoration awards against PRPs; 221 significant federalism questions governing the relationship between
the federal government and the states in handling Superfund matters; 229 and the ever-present budgetary debates, to name but a few. 230
A full discussion of any of these issues is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, these issues are highlighted because it would be
a serious error to view reform of the jurisdictional bar in a vacuum
without considering the impact of other reforms on any changes to
231
the bar.
223. These would include exemptions for PRPs at municipal landfills and generators
and transporters of wastes in quantities deemed to be de minimis.
224. See Silverman, Bliley to Offer, supra note 12 (discussing, generally,
brownfields redevelopment issues in Superfund reform initiatives).
225. As explained throughout this Article, protracted litigation over cleanups and
the costs associated with that litigation has always been a major criticism of CERCLA.
See DeBenedictis, supra note 44, at 30 ("[A] mere 12 percent of the money spent by
insurance companies goes toward actually cleaning up hazardous wastes. The remaining
88 percent is spent on litigating claims and administration ....
[I]nsurance companies
spent about $410 million on Superfund transaction costs in 1989, the last year studied.").
This is now a driving impetus for its reform. There are a number of proposals being
discussed that would do this in a variety of ways. For example, one proposal has been the
use of a neutral third party to allocate cleanup responsibility in a non-litigation setting.
See Schiffer II, supra note 221 (criticizing one version of a third party allocator system
as unworkable). Interestingly, however, a full repeal of the jurisdictional bar as is currently
being discussed would run counter to these efforts.
226. See DeBenedictis, supra note 44, at 30 (discussing, generally, impact of
CERCLA scheme on insurance industry).
227. See Ritchie, supra note 220, at 12 (discussing disagreements over NPL cap).
228. See Schiffer II, supra note 221 (sharply criticizing $50 million liability cap as
obstacle preventing cleanup of serious harm).
229. See Superfund: NCSL Committee Approves Policy Listing CERCLA Reform
Recommendations, 1995 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 241 (Dec. 15, 1995) (discussing
reaction of environment committee of National Conference of State Legislatures to
CERCLA reform initiatives, focussing on state perspectives); John Pendergrass, So Far,
Reviews on 104th Are Mixed, ENVTL. F., Jan./Feb. 1996, at 6 (discussing impact of
Superfund reform proposals on states generally).
230. These budgetary debates include two primary issues. The first is the amount
of money that will be placed in the Superfund and, of course, the source of that money,
See The Taxing Dilemma, INs. ADVOC., Jan. 6, 1996, at 1, 36 (discussing difficulties in
resolving source and amount of tax revenue for Superfund). The second question is the
resource allocation question concerning how much money Congress will give to the EPA
to conduct its investigatory and remedial work connected with the Superfund program. For
a general review of some of the significant focal points for reform, see Madsen, Arfmann,
& Galbavy, supra note 10.
231. For example, if retroactive liability is eliminated, there should be significantly
less litigation. If that is true, perhaps the overwhelming fear of dilatory litigation becomes
less compelling.
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Whether or not Superfund and CERCLA reform happens during the 104th Congress will turn largely on whether or not these
contentious issues are resolved. It will also turn on whether the
budget impasse of early 1996 has a lasting negative impact;2 2 the
role of environmental issues as a matter of political concern during
the 1996 election season;233 and the state of relations between oppos-

232. These budget impasses resulted in two periods of federal government "shutdowns" in late 1995 and early 1996. This has had a three-fold impact on the legislative
agenda, environmental and otherwise. First, it has delayed consideration of many issues
on the legislative calendar. See, e.g., Ritchie, supra note 220 at 11 ("The continuing budget
battle between Congress and the White House has bogged down just about everything else
moving through committees."); Congressional Impasse Has GOP, EPA Reshaping Approaches, 1996 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 22 (February 2, 1996) ("President Clinton
and Congress are locked in seemingly fruitless negotiations over the seven-year balanced
budget plan and individual fiscal 1996 appropriations bills, and a significant portion of the
federal government has been limping along on a series of stopgap spending bills').
Secondly, because environmental statutes have significant budgetary implications, it is
particularly difficult for them to be addressed effectively until budgetary issues are
resolved. For a general discussion of the particular impact of the budget impasse on
Superfund, see John H. Cushman, Jr., New Jersey Lawmakers in Support of Superfund,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1996, at A15. Finally, the budget crisis has exacerbated tensions
between the legislature and the executive, as well as between- the two political parties,
making necessary environmental compromises more difficult than they otherwise might
have been. See Wrap-Up Report 104th Congress, First Session, PULSE REPORT (Environmental and Energy Study Institute), Jan. 1996, at 1 ("[B]udget and appropriations debate
ground the [Republican] charge to a near halt, with intra-party and inter-chamber disputes
over funding and policy for the Environmental Protection Agency, Interior Department and
other agencies taking a huge toll on Republican unity, while energizing a Democratic
opposition that had been tepid for much of the session."); 4 Members of Congress Agree
Budget Negotiations Holding Up Actions on HUD, Superfund, 'Disasters', INS. ADvoc.,
Mar. 23, 1996, at 23 ("[The ongoing budget negotiations are stymieing activities on other
key pending legislation such as Superfund reform....").
233. The fact that 1996 is an election year may have an impact in a number of ways.
First, some may have a real incentive to postpone controversial legislation until after the
election when the political makeup of Congress may be different. See Silverman, Superfund Seeks Permanence, supra note 197 ("George Baker, executive director of the
Superfund Reform '95 coalition [predicted] that a liberal constituency exists among the
Democrats 'that would prefer not to have any bill.' Their reasoning is that the Democrats
may take over the House and Senate in the November 1996 elections, giving their party
free reign to do their own Superfund reform bill . . . :'). In addition, the status of the
environment as a 1996 campaign issue is unclear. The public's concern with the environment waxes and wanes. See Amy Porter, Superfund, Clean Water Top Priorityfor House
Commerce Panel, Counsel Says, Natl. Env't Daily (BNA) (Jan 24, 1996) (noting that
"attempts to reform environmental statutes lack support outside the Washington Beltway");
Bob Benenson, A Mature "Green" America Spawns Grass-Roots Anti-Regulatory Rebellion, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., June 17, 1995, at 1694, 1695 (quoting University of Chicago
economist Don Cousey, who "describes environmental protection as a 'luxury good,' the
demand for which rises in times of affluence and declines in periods of economic stress");
Bob Benenson, GOP Sets the 104th Congress on New Regulatory Course, CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP., June 17, 1995, at 1693, 1697 ("Election Day exit polls show that the environment
is rarely a galvanizing issue for voters . . . ."). But see id. at 1696. ("[A]n annual survey
conducted by Roper Starch Worldwide, Inc. has shown consistently in recent years that
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ing political factions in the legislative and executive branches.234 How-

ever, if Superfund reform does take place, the jurisdictional bar
should be "on the table" for reform.
In the current discussions of CERCLA reform, there have been
a number of proposals for dealing with the issue of the jurisdictional bar. Unfortunately, neither of the major proposals has adopted
the approach advocated by this Article or created by the GammaTech court; thus both are seriously flawed.235
One proposal being seriously considered in House Bill 2500
is to eliminate the bar completely 2 6 by adding a sixth opportunity
to challenge a cleanup plan. Rather than the narrow exception
advocated by this article, this proposal in H.R. 2500 would allow
the review of a cleanup plan in "[a]ny action to review a final
record of decision regarding the selection of a remedy under this
Act.' 237 This would, in effect, allow a PRP to challenge any cleanup
order from the moment it became finalized. This would obviously
address the desire to allow a challenge based on health and safety
concerns, but it also would "throw out the baby with the bath
water" by allowing all other challenges to be made as well.

more than 75 percent of Americans view themselves as active environmentalists or
sympathetic but not active on the environment."); John H. Cushman Jr., Democrats Fight
to Restore Curbed Programs, N.Y. T MES, Mar. 14, 1996, at B3 ("The Democrats, citing
poll data showing that many Americans were concerned about environmental issues,
believe that Republican efforts to roll back environmental regulations might be a potent
issue in this year's Presidential campaign:'); Dennis Farney & Timothy Noah, Down to
Earth: Environmental Stands Alienate Some Backers of the GOP'sAgenda, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 5, 1996, at Al ('The environment will be one of the concerns at the forefront of
GOP primaries... "').
To the extent that the environment does not emerge as a matter
of popular voter concern, attention may be focused instead on more dramatic campaign
issues. See also John H. Cushman, Jr., Adversaries Back the Current Rules Curbing
Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1996, at Al (discussing development of President Clinton's
environmental campaign platform).
234. See, e.g., The 104th Congress and Clinton'sHome Stretch, ENVTL. F., Jan./Feb.
1996, at 38 ('This month marks the beginning of the 104th Congress's second, and last,
session and President Clinton's home stretch going into the fall election. Needless to say,
the two sides have had little to agree on in the area of environmental policy.").
235. It was reported that a draft report to the Judicial Review Committee of the
Administrative Conference of the United States advocated a form of health-based challenge to cleanup plans. See Draft ACUS Report Recommends End to Superfund Judicial
Review Bar, PESTICIDE & Toxic CHEMICAL NEWS, Apr. 26, 1995, available in Westlaw,

PTCHEMN File, WL 8217806. However, the committee postponed any action on the
preliminary draft. Id.
236. This proposal may be found in H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), as
introduced October 18, 1995.
237. Id. at § 114.
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Assistant Attorney General Lois Schiffer expressed these concerns when that particular provision was before the House committees:
I am particularly concerned that significant delays in cleanups
would be caused by the provision that destroys the current
"pre-enforcement review bar" of Section 113(h)of CERCLA.
This opens the door to private parties to go to court to stop
cleanups that are now underway. The result could be severe
delays in cleanup while the issue of what remedy is appropriate
is revisited and litigated. Once the door is opened to this kind
in remedies could be widespread and
of litigation, the delays
2 38
could go on for years.

In addition to concerns about runaway litigation, concerns were
also raised about the financial cost of such a proposal.

39 Yet,

other

proposals continued to include similarly broad expansions of the
pre-enforcement review provisions.
The major Senate reform bill embodies another proposal to
change the jurisdictional bar.240 This, too, would add a sixth method

through which a remedial plan may be challenged under section
238. Schiffer II, supra note 221.
239. For instance:
One of the fiercest debates arose over an amendment by Rep. Bart Stupak
(D-Mich) that would have removed the provision of HR 2500 allowing parties
to reopen old cleanup method decisions to court challenges. The provision
also would allow potentially responsible parties to challenge a cleanup decision before cleanup occurs. Stupak quoted a Justice Department statement that
the provision could reopen 1,900 new cases and cost an additional $800 million.
Ritchie, supra note 220, at 11. "But, Oxley said reopening old cleanup decisions could
save money if cheaper methods can qualify under an overhauled superfund law." Id. There
is some merit to the claim that early review will, at times, result in a savings to the EPA-a
savings that may, at times, even offset the cost. This was recognized by the Gamma-Tech
court itself:
Interim judicial review is often advantageous to the EPA . . . . [I]f a court
finds defects in the EPA's response action, they may be corrected before
further unwarranted drains on limited Superfund resources occur-a result the
EPA would no doubt find desirable. A knee-jerk opposition to a reasonable
interpretation of the jurisdictional limitations on judicial review in CERCLA
is therefore not consistent with the aims of the Act.
United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc., 31 F.3d 138, 149 (3d Cir. 1994). However,
as a general rule the danger of dilatory litigation would seem to outweigh this potential
benefit.
240. S. 1285, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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113(h). Specifically, it would allow for a review in "[ain action
under section 129(c)." 241 Section 129(c), unfortunately, is a fairly
open-ended proposal that allows judicial review of "a remedial
action plan the implementation of which is projected to cost more
than $15,000,000'242 There is no other limit beyond projected cost
specified in the bill. Given that the average cost of a cleanup is
significantly higher than $15,000,000,243 this proposed exception
will likely allow legal challenges at most sites. 244 In addition, there
are few advantages to linking the ability to challenge a cleanup to
the cost of the cleanup, since health and safety risks are not always
tied to the cost of the cleanup.
Thus, it appears as though current Congressional thinking on
this issue wisely recognizes the danger of the strict ban. However,
in seeking to lift the jurisdictional bar so expansively, legitimate
concerns about efficient cleanups are dismissed.

VI. CONCLUSION

CERCLA and its refinements through SARA were created to
foster efficient cleanup of hazardous waste sites that contaminate
the land and pose a health and safety risk to humans and to the
natural environment. Yet, from the beginning, this ambition was
inextricably intertwined with the reality that judicial review can
both help and hinder this goal. 245 As a general rule, delaying judicial review will advance the improvement of the environment by
expediting necessary-and often long overdue-remedial measures. 24 6
However, like all "general rules," there are circumstances in which
241. Id. at § 407(a).
242. Id. at § 404.
243. See Madsen, Arfmann, & Galbavy, supra note 10, at 1024.
244. Although the monetary limitation may weed out challenges to some of the
smaller cleanup projects, this provision is not one that will have any impact on many of
the major, most troubling sites.
245. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 253(111), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1986), reprintedin

1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3039 (addressing the necessity "to strike a balance between the
need to protect the rights of those affected by hazardous waste sites (both those potentially
harmed by those sites and those responsible for the clean-up of those sites) and the need
to ensure speedy cleanups of hazardous waste sites").
246. See generally Moore, supra note 31, for a discussion of bars on pre-enforcement jurisdictional review in the context of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act.
This article provides an excellent comparison between the enforcement review problems
under each of these environmental statutes.
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the jurisdictional bar poses a potential threat to the environment
when it requires a "remedy" to be pursued that irrevocably harms
health or the environment.
These cases will, undoubtedly, be few. However, prevention of
environmental harm is a need compelling enough to justify an
exception that will allow a court to review a proposed remedial
plan if it is an environmental or health threat. Congress is now in
an excellent position to create a narrow exception to accomplish
this. It has a judicial model in the form of the Gamma-Tech decision and the proposal advocated in this Article. Crafting this exception narrowly and carefully will help thwart some of its potential pitfalls. Doing so may be difficult and may require compromise.
But, this does not justify leaving the task undone and untried, nor
should it be the impetus for removing a bar that serves a legitimate
role.

